Values and Modes of Rationality in Economic Science

Abstract

Virtually since its birth 200 years ago, modern economic thinking has been plagued by the question of what role to assign to values in economic theory and research. The dominant stance, initially set forth by Nassau Senior and rigorously reiterated and sophisticated by J. S. Mill, J. M. Keynes, Lionel Robbins, J. A. Schumpeter and M. Friedman, has been that scientific economics and ethical questions must be kept unambiguously separate. Scientific or positive economics deals with questions of fact or “is” questions, while normative economics deals with value or “ought” questions. As scientists, economists must content themselves with the analysis of positive issues. Values are viewed as beyond the purview of science, and consequently they must be taken as given, determined by social processes in which the economist might participate only as citizen. That this is the dominant understanding of what an appropriate stance toward values must be is attested to by its appearance in the preface or introductory chapter of most mainstream economics textbooks.

Citation

Wisman, J.D. (1980), "Values and Modes of Rationality in Economic Science", International Journal of Social Economics, Vol. 7 No. 3, pp. 137-148. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb013862