Do Advisory Fees Contain Evidence of a Principal‐Agent Conflict?
Charles A. Stone
(Visiting Professor at Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris and Universitée Paris Dauphine)
Anne Zissu
(Assistant Professor at Temple University and Visiting Professor at Ecole Supérieure de Commerce de Paris and Universitée Paris Dauphine)
50
Abstract
In a world where the objectives of managers differ from the objectives of shareholders, the analysis of management response to a tender offer must consider the possibility that management's response is a function of their equity interest in the company.
Citation
Stone, C.A. and Zissu, A. (1993), "Do Advisory Fees Contain Evidence of a Principal‐Agent Conflict?", Managerial Finance, Vol. 19 No. 1, pp. 1-6. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb013705
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 1993, MCB UP Limited