A COMPLIANCE‐RESOURCE THEORY OF REGULATORY FAILURE: THE CASE OF O.S.H.A.

Abstract

Neither capture theory, nor neo‐conservative theory and technical failure arguments adequately account for the behaviour of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OHSA) during the 1970s. A framework drawn from organisation theory suggests that regulatory failure is due to a crisis of compliance resources caused by a flawed legislative mandate. Lacking effective compliance mechanisms, regulatory agencies are forced into a bargaining posture rather than an enforcement stance towards industry. This leads to creation of de facto policy which diverges substantially from the original legislative mandate, and this is read as evidence for regulation failure.

Citation

Newman, K.S. (1985), "A COMPLIANCE‐RESOURCE THEORY OF REGULATORY FAILURE: THE CASE OF O.S.H.A.", International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, Vol. 5 No. 1, pp. 29-53. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb012977