TY - JOUR AB - Minsky's frame conception of knowledge and its two precursors (Kuhn's “paradigms” and Bartlett's “schemata”) are considered. Against this background, a theory of knowledge is developed. This theory of knowledge draws on a model of argumentation. This model is illustrated by discussing the notion of “defeasibility” in law. The model is shown to capture the concepts of presumption and plausibility and these notions are shown to capture the diverse features of both precursors to the frame conception of knowledge. VL - 12 IS - 3 SN - 0368-492X DO - 10.1108/eb005652 UR - https://doi.org/10.1108/eb005652 AU - JOHNSON L. PY - 1983 Y1 - 1983/01/01 TI - EPISTEMICS AND THE FRAME CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE T2 - Kybernetes PB - MCB UP Ltd SP - 177 EP - 181 Y2 - 2024/03/28 ER -