EPISTEMICS AND THE FRAME CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE
L. JOHNSON
(The Man‐Computer Studies Group, Post‐graduate Division of Cybernetics, Brunel University, Uxbridge, Middlesex UB8 3PH (UK))
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Abstract
Minsky's frame conception of knowledge and its two precursors (Kuhn's “paradigms” and Bartlett's “schemata”) are considered. Against this background, a theory of knowledge is developed. This theory of knowledge draws on a model of argumentation. This model is illustrated by discussing the notion of “defeasibility” in law. The model is shown to capture the concepts of presumption and plausibility and these notions are shown to capture the diverse features of both precursors to the frame conception of knowledge.
Citation
JOHNSON, L. (1983), "EPISTEMICS AND THE FRAME CONCEPTION OF KNOWLEDGE", Kybernetes, Vol. 12 No. 3, pp. 177-181. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb005652
Publisher
:MCB UP Ltd
Copyright © 1983, MCB UP Limited