MECHANISM, INTERROGATION AND INCOMPLETENESS

Abstract

It has been argued that Gödel's theorem proves the case against the possibility of artificially intelligent machines, capable of achieving the same level of intelligence as human beings. The argument is that if a human being were a logistic system L, how is possible that it can see certain theorems to be provable when Gödel shows that such a system cannot demonstrate whether such theorems are provable or not. The fallacy is that the theorems of L that the human can see to be provable are a subset L′ of L, and that for some theorems of L′ and not L the human is subject to the same limitation as the machine.

Citation

GEORGE, F.H. (1972), "MECHANISM, INTERROGATION AND INCOMPLETENESS", Kybernetes, Vol. 1 No. 2, pp. 109-114. https://doi.org/10.1108/eb005301