Independent review of the Easter 1998 UK floods

Citation

(1999), "Independent review of the Easter 1998 UK floods", Disaster Prevention and Management, Vol. 8 No. 1. https://doi.org/10.1108/dpm.1999.07308aab.004

Independent review of the Easter 1998 UK floods

Independent review of the Easter 1998 UK floods

The Independent Review Team comprising Mr Peter Bye (Chairman) and Dr Michael Horner (Technical Advisor) was appointed by the Environment Agency on 28 April to assess the Agency's performance during the Easter floods. The Review Team published a preliminary report on 2 June 1998 and presented its final report on 1 October 1998.

The Review Team was given open access to UK Environmental Agency staff, documents and records. It visited and/or studied around 70 sites that were significantly flooded in England and Wales. Meetings and interviews were arranged with flood victims, local authority managers and members, officers from the emergency services, and interested observers. The Team considered over 200 reports and letters and received information and advice from the research community.

These are the Review Team's key findings:

Between Maundy Thursday and Easter Saturday very heavy rain fell in a band between 50km and 100km wide and 300km long in an east north easterly direction from the Black Mountains in Wales to north Cambridgeshire. The highest precipitation in 48 hours was 90mm at Pershore and 97mm at Peterborough. Persistent heavy rain on already saturated land caused rivers to rise at rates twice that previously recorded and to record heights. This unusual weather acting on saturated catchments caused the floods.

The resulting floods were the worst on record in an area of some 5,000km² bounded by Bedford in the east, Evesham in the west, Peterborough in the north, and Oxford in the south. The estimated annual probabilities range from 1.3 per cent to 0.6 per cent ­ return periods of between 75 and 170 years.

Around 4,500 families lost their homes, some of them permanently, with insured and uninsured losses estimated at between £300m and £350m. Northampton and Leamington Spa were particularly badly damaged.

The UK Environment Agency reliably established the extent and severity of the floods in most locations. As the events were the most severe ever recorded in many places and developed with unprecedented speed, flood plain maps, forecasting models and recording equipment were inadequate in some areas, most notably Northampton.

Closer collaboration with the Met Office on forecasting and media dissemination of information about extreme weather would be beneficial for the public and both organizations.

Flood warnings were issued in accordance with current Agency policy in most locations. Nevertheless the majority of flood victims received no warnings from the Agency. In particular no warnings were issued to the residents of Far Cotton and St James in Northampton. Lack of public awareness of the warning systems, inconsistent application across regions, and misunderstandings between the Agency and emergency services, resulted in poor overall performance.

Emergency planning and preparations by the Agency successfully ensured the operation of main river defence systems to the planned standards. Joint planning for extreme events with emergency services and other partners requires urgent attention.

Flood defences generally were in good order and there were no structural failures during the floods. At defended locations inundation resulted from river levels exceeding design standards hitherto regarded as adequate. At Northampton there were gaps in the defences in areas not owned by the Environment Agency. In our estimation these deficiencies did not significantly increase the extent and severity of the floods in those areas.

Meetings with flood victims and their representatives revealed widespread misunderstandings about the role of the Agency in flood defence, its resources and capability. The Environment Agency, working alongside local authorities and other partners, should move the priorities of its flood defence work from engineering to human solutions. People who do not understand what they can do to protect themselves when warned are not protected. A sustained public information and education programme, comparable to that deployed until recently for civil defence, may be required.

Development in the flood plains and surrounding areas should be strictly controlled because of its direct effect on risks to people and property.

Consent for caravan sites in flood risk locations and their licensing should be strictly enforced. Site owners should be required to devise and display flood warning and evacuation procedures.

The role of flood defence as an essential public protection service should be recognised by the Environment Agency and by Government.

The Review Team welcomes the recommendations of the Agriculture Select Committee on strengthening flood defence and joins them in urging the Government, on behalf of all people living in flood risk areas, particularly those whose lives were devastated at Easter, to initiate a funded programme of improvements.