NTSB safety recommendations

Citation

(2008), "NTSB safety recommendations", Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology, Vol. 80 No. 2. https://doi.org/10.1108/aeat.2008.12780bab.019

NTSB safety recommendations

Article Type: Safety topic and notes From: Aircraft Engineering and Aerospace Technology: An International Journal, Volume 80, Issue 2.

Safety Recommendations A-07-57

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA: Immediately require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to conduct arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on existing performance data, actual conditions, and incorporating a minimum safety margin of 15 per cent (A-07-57)

Safety Recommendations A-07-58 through -64

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA.

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to ensure that all on board electronic computing devices they use automatically and clearly display critical performance calculation assumptions (A-07-58).

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to provide clear guidance and training to pilots and dispatchers regarding company policy on surface condition and braking action reports and the assumptions affecting landing distance/ stopping margin calculations, to include use of aeroplane ground deceleration devices, wind conditions and limits, air distance, and safety margins (A-07-59).

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators of thrust reverser- equipped aeroplanes to incorporate a procedure requiring the non-flying (monitoring) pilot to check and confirm the thrust reverser status immediately after touchdown on all landings (A-07-60).

Require all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121, 135, and 91 subpart K operators to accomplish arrival landing distance assessments before every landing based on a standardised methodology involving approved performance data, actual arrival conditions, a means of correlating the aeroplane's braking ability with runway surface conditions using the most conservative interpretation available, and including a minimum safety margin of 15 per cent (A-07-61).

Develop and issue formal guidance regarding standards and guidelines for the development, delivery, and interpretation of runway surface condition reports (A-07-62).

Establish a minimum standard for 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 and 135 operators to use in correlating an aeroplane's braking ability to braking action reports and runway contaminant type and depth reports for runway surface conditions worse than bare and dry (A-07-63).

Demonstrate the technical and operational feasibility of outfitting transport-category aeroplanes with equipment and procedures required to routinely calculate, record, and convey the aeroplane braking ability required and/or available to slow or stop the aeroplane during the landing roll. If feasible, require operators of transport- category aeroplanes to incorporate use of such equipment and related procedures into their operations (A-07-64).

Safety Recommendations A-07-65 through -69

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA.

Require that UA transponders provide beacon code and altitude information to air traffic control and to aircraft equipped with traffic collision avoidance systems at all times while airborne by ensuring that the transponder is powered via the emergency or battery bus (A-07-65).

Require that all conversations, including telephone conversations, between unmanned aircraft (UA) pilots and air traffic control, other UA pilots, and other assets that provide operational support to UAS operations, be recorded and retained in accordance with FAA Orders 7210.3 and 8020.11 (A-07-66).

Require periodic operational reviews between the UAS operations teams and local air traffic control facilities, with specific emphasis on face-to-face co-ordination between working-level controllers and UA pilot(s), to clearly define responsibilities and actions required for standard and non- standard UAS operations. These operational reviews should include, but not be limited to, discussion on lost-link profiles and procedures, the potential for unique emergency situations and methods to mitigate them, platform- specific aircraft characteristics, and airspace management procedures (A-07-67).

Require that established procedures for handling piloted aircraft emergencies be applied to UASs (A-07-68).

Require that all UAS operators report to the FAA, in writing within 30 days of occurrence, all incidents and malfunctions that affect safety; require that operators are analysing these data in an effort to improve safety; and evaluate these data to determine whether programs and procedures, including those under air traffic control, remain effective in mitigating safety risks (A-07-69).

Safety Recommendations A-07-87 and -88

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA.

Require that all existing and new turbine-powered helicopters operating in the Gulf of Mexico and certificated with five or more seats be equipped with externally mounted life rafts large enough to accommodate all occupants (A-07-87).

Require that all offshore helicopter operators in the Gulf of Mexico provide their flight crews with personal flotation devices equipped with a waterproof, global positioning system-enabled 406MHz personal locator beacon, as well as one other signalling device, such as a signalling mirror or a strobe light (A-07-88).

Safety Recommendations A-07-89 through -92

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA.

Require periodic en route surveillance of all repetitively flown commercial air tour routes in the Grand Canyon area, including those routes located outside of the Special Federal Aviation Regulations No. 50-2 airspace (A-07-89).

Require all commercial air tour operators to maintain records of all safety-related complaints and complaint correspondence regarding pilot performance, document what actions the company took to address each complaint, and make the records available to the principal operations inspector for periodic review (A-07-90).

Require all commercial air tour operators to maintain the names and contact information of all passengers, along with the respective flight's identification number, for at least 30 days following the flights (A-07-91).

Encourage commercial air tour operators to establish a structured flight operations monitoring program that incorporates routine reviews of all available sources of information to ensure that pilots are conducting flights in accordance with company operating practices (A-07-92).

Safety Recommendations A-07-93 through -95

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the Tour Operators Program of Safety.

Expand the safety audit program to include a review of records of all safety- related complaints and complaint correspondence regarding pilot performance (A-07-93).

Expand the safety audit program to include en route surveillance of all repetitively flown commercial air tour routes in the Grand Canyon area (A-07-94).

Revise the safety audit program guidance materials to include a clear definition of “air tour flight” to ensure that auditors and members effectively implement en route surveillance of all air tour flight routes (A-07-95).

Safety Recommendation A-07-96

The National Transportation Safety Board recommends that the FAA.

Require air carriers to revise their cabin crew training manuals and programs to ensure that the manuals and programs state that a door must remain open while the air conditioning (A/C) cart is connected, advise that the A/C cart can pressurise the aeroplane on the ground if all doors are closed, and warn about the dangers of opening any door while the air conditioning cart is supplying conditioned (cooled or heated) air to the cabin (A-07-96).