A Response to David Carpenter’s ‘Virtue Ethics in the Practice and Review of Social Science Research’

Abstract

This article is a response to Carpenter’s ‘Virtue Ethics in the Practice and Review of Social Science Research: The Virtuous Ethics Committee’. While applauding his attempt to introduce the concept of ‘virtue ethics’ into the contemporary discourse about the practice and review of social science research, I suggest that his thinking is overly dependent on the work of Macfarlane (2009 & 2010); particularly with respect to drawing a sharp contrast between this concept and the use of principles to construct an ethical framework for research and its review. I argue that Carpenter’s article would have benefited from a critique of the conceptual limitations of Macfarlane’s work, particularly in a context where social science research is increasingly participatory. Following O’Neill (1996), I argue that ethical principles can be understood as universal values that orientate practical reasoning or deliberative inquiry into what constitutes virtuous action in particular cases. Such deliberative inquiry may also be guided by what Nussbaum (1990) depicts as ‘rules of thumb’; summaries of good concrete judgements and decisions that are the cumulative outcomes of past deliberations about how to realise ethical principles in action. I argue that these ‘rules’ do not prescribe action since they cannot be considered as ethically prior to concrete descriptions of cases. Rather, they evolve out of the deliberative process of case study itself. As Nussbaum (1990) points out, Aristotle argued for the ethical priority of concrete description over any general rule that might be applied to it. This does not, however, deny the practical significance of summaries of judgements based on a constant comparison of cases. Instead, such rules can be understood as practical hypotheses to be tested by participants in a social practice within each new concrete situation. I argue that one limitation of the dispositional frameworks that Carpenter cites as providing a basis for the practice and review of social research is their highly generic character. Much research aimed at achieving social ends is shaped by more specifically orientated professional and social practices governed by particular ends-in-view that can be conceptually linked to them. In conclusion, I suggest that, since much social research explicitly aspires to be a participatory and democratic process of knowledge construction, it should provide a starting point for ethical review, where engagement between ‘the committee’ and ‘researchers’ transcends the bureaucratic exercise of reviewing documents.

Citation

Elliott, J. (2018), "A Response to David Carpenter’s ‘Virtue Ethics in the Practice and Review of Social Science Research’", Emmerich, N. (Ed.) Virtue Ethics in the Conduct and Governance of Social Science Research (Advances in Research Ethics and Integrity, Vol. 3), Emerald Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 141-154. https://doi.org/10.1108/S2398-601820180000003008