This chapter explores a number of issues connected with the use of game-theoretic models to organize analytic narratives, both generally and specifically. First, a causal explanation of the Rhineland crisis of 1936 is developed within the confines of a game-theoretic model of asymmetric or unilateral deterrence. Then some methodological obstacles that may arise in more complex cases are discussed and suggestions for overcoming them are offered. Finally, the advantages of using game models to more fully understand real world events are highlighted.
Zagare, F. (2011), "Analytic Narratives, Game Theory, and Peace Science", Chatterji, M., Bo, C. and Misra, R. (Ed.) Frontiers of Peace Economics and Peace Science (Contributions to Conflict Management, Peace Economics and Development, Vol. 16), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 19-35. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1572-8323(2011)0000016006Download as .RIS
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