Bargaining game and LDCs' commercial bank debt restructuring outcomes

Abstract

When faced with a financial crisis, debtor countries rarely choose to default on their international financial obligations. Instead, they typically choose to renegotiate their debt service obligations. According to a number of economists, the main motivating factor behind borrowers' and creditors' willingness to restructure is the benefit associated with preserving international trade ties. This raises an interesting question: is the benefit associated with maintaining international trade ties shared equally between the borrower and creditor banks? Or is the outcome dependent on a so-called ‘bargaining game’ between the borrower and creditor banks, and if so, can we identify these variables? According to our analysis, as a borrower's trade ties with developed countries strengthen, the borrower's (and/or creditor's) bargaining power diminishes (strengthens) and it thereafter agrees to restructure at less favourable terms. However, even after controlling for trade ties, we found that major borrowers were able to extract more concessions from the lenders.

Citation

Han, K.C., Lee, S. and Suk, D.Y. (2011), "Bargaining game and LDCs' commercial bank debt restructuring outcomes", Batten, J.A. and Szilagyi, P.G. (Ed.) The Impact of the Global Financial Crisis on Emerging Financial Markets (Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, Vol. 93), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 199-229. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-3759(2011)0000093008