TY  - CHAP
AB  - Abstract In this paper, we explore an extensive panel data set covering more than 4,000 listed firms in 16 European countries to study the effects of shareholder protection on ownership structure and firm performance. We document a negative firm-level correlation between shareholder protection and ownership concentration. Differentiating between shareholder types, we find that this pattern is mainly driven by strategic investors. In contrast, we find a positive correlation between shareholder protection and block ownership of institutional investors, in particular when we restrict the analysis to independent institutional investors. Finally, we find that independent institutional investors are positively associated with firm valuation as measured by Tobin’s Q. The opposite applies for strategic investors. Overall, our results are consistent with the view that (i) high shareholder protection and (ii) limited ownership by strategic investors make small investors and investors interested in security returns more confident in their investments.
VL  - 19
SN  - 978-1-78635-165-4, 978-1-78635-166-1/1569-3732
DO  - 10.1108/S1569-373220160000019003
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220160000019003
AU  - Rapp Marc Steffen
AU  - Trinchera Oliver
PY  - 2017
Y1  - 2017/01/01
TI  - Regulation and the Ownership Structure of European Listed Firms
T2  - Global Corporate Governance
T3  - Advances in Financial Economics
PB  - Emerald Publishing Limited
SP  - 23
EP  - 76
Y2  - 2024/05/12
ER  -