TY  - CHAP
AB  - Abstract We examine changes in controlling shareholder holdings, looking for evidence of financial tunneling (unfair wealth transfers from public investors to controlling shareholders). Our sample comprises yearly data during 2000–2011 on 75 large Israeli companies. We find that controlling shareholders are successful in timing the stock market – there exists a significant negative correlation between changes in the mean controlling shareholders’ equity holdings and market return. There is also some evidence that controlling shareholders increase (decrease) their holdings before years of positive (negative) excess returns in their shares. However, statistically significant mean excess returns are documented only after decreases in controlling shareholders’ holdings. Thus, we offer only limited support for the financial tunneling hypothesis.
VL  - 18
SN  - 978-1-78560-355-6, 978-1-78560-354-9/1569-3732
DO  - 10.1108/S1569-373220150000018002
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S1569-373220150000018002
AU  - Abudy Menachem (Meni)
AU  - Lauterbach Beni
PY  - 2015
Y1  - 2015/01/01
TI  - Changes in Controlling Shareholders’ Holdings: Do they Entail Financial Tunneling?
T2  - International Corporate Governance
T3  - Advances in Financial Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 47
EP  - 63
Y2  - 2024/04/23
ER  -