Chapter 4 Between Vienna and Amsterdam (1923–1927)

Abstract

In 1923, an issue entered the discussion between Schreier² and myself, though hardly anyone else in Vienna was interested in it at that time. Historically, the topic was connected with the question of intuition or Wesensschau, but substantially, in my opinion, the two were quite distinct. Elaborating on ideas of the 19th century algebraist L. Kronecker and eloquently supported by Weyl,³ the Dutch mathematician L. E. J. Brouwer developed what he called intuitionistic mathematics, the mathematical controversy centred on existential propositions. But those who closely associated intuitionism in mathematics with the intuition in Husserl's pure phenomenology or Bergson's metaphysics were misled by the similarity of the two words. Whatever, if anything, Brouwer's reconstruction of mathematics and the phenomenology in Husserl's Ideas had in common, they certainly had opposite effects: Husserl claimed for his Wesensschau (and Bergson for his intuition) insights that empiricists such as Schilck denied or regarded as empty words. Brouwer, to the contrary, rejected statements that everyone else claimed to be solid parts of mathematics, and he denied or regarded as empty words theorems proved by men such as Hilbert.

Citation

Becchio, G. (2009), "Chapter 4 Between Vienna and Amsterdam (1923–1927)", Becchio, G. (Ed.) Unexplored Dimensions: Karl Mengeron Economics and Philosophy (1923–1938) (Advances in Austrian Economics, Vol. 12), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 65-68. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1529-2134(2009)0000012012