What Human Rights aren’t for: Human Rights Function as Moral, Political and Legal Standards – But not as Intervention-Conditions

Abstract

An influential strand of human rights theory explains human rights through appeal to their function. Such ‘function’ theories highlight the role human rights play in international practice and discourse as standards for appropriate state treatment of individuals. But standards in what sense? Standards to be promoted and encouraged through public critique, bilateral pressure, institutional censure or legal culpability? Or standards to be protected and defended through all necessary means? I argue that function theorists conflate (what states themselves recognize as) the important distinctions between these standards. Worse still, many function theorists argue that a major – even definitive – role of human rights involves demarcating permissibility conditions for humanitarian intervention. I argue that this claim gravely mischaracterizes international practice and discourse – in particular it fails to recognize the independent significance of other functional norms operating within the global context. The theorists correctly perceive that we have powerful reasons for wanting this role (of threshold conditions for military intervention) fulfilled, but by mistaking the norms that in fact fulfil it, they distort the actual function of human rights.

Citation

Breakey, H. (2015), "What Human Rights aren’t for: Human Rights Function as Moral, Political and Legal Standards – But not as Intervention-Conditions", Conscience, Leadership and the Problem of ‘Dirty Hands’ (Research in Ethical Issues in Organizations, Vol. 13), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 41-59. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1529-209620150000013003