Diffusion of Fraud Through Subprime Lending: The Perfect Storm

Abstract

The 2000–2006 housing market bubble conformed to a classic boom–bust scenario that triggered the most serious and costly financial crisis since the Great Depression. The 2008 subprime mortgage collapse leveraged a financial system that privatizes profits and socializes risks. Several factors converge to set up the subprime mortgage market as an easy target for industry insiders to exploit. Enabling legislation expanded the potential pool of borrowers eligible for subprime mortgages and structured incentives to lenders willing to assume the risks. The securitization of subprime mortgages transformed bundles of high-risk loans into mortgage-backed securities that were in demand by domestic and foreign investors. Pressure to edge out competition produced high-risk loans marketed to unqualified borrowers. The final piece in the setup of the subprime lending crisis was a move from an origination model to a distributive model by many financial institutions in the business of lending. We find that the diffusion and totality of these business practices produced a criminogenic opportunity structure for industry insiders to profit at the expense of homebuyers and later investors.

Citation

Patterson, L.A. and Koller, C.A. (2011), "Diffusion of Fraud Through Subprime Lending: The Perfect Storm", Deflem, M. (Ed.) Economic Crisis and Crime (Sociology of Crime, Law and Deviance, Vol. 16), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 25-45. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1521-6136(2011)0000016005