The Effects of Guanxi and Compensation Structure on the Objectivity of Chinese Internal Auditors

Abstract

Purpose

This study examines the effects of incentive compensation and guanxi, a type of informal personal relationship between people, on the objectivity of Chinese internal auditors. Given that the objectivity of internal auditors is essential for promoting financial reporting quality, it is important to investigate the effectiveness of internal audit functions, especially in emerging markets where the corporate governance mechanisms designed to promote objectivity are less mature.

Methodology/Approach

The research employs a 2 × 2 between participants experiment with 116 graduate accounting student participants.

Findings

After controlling for internal auditors’ ethicality, we find that close-guanxi between management and internal auditors and incentive compensation in the form of bonuses based upon meeting earnings targets both have the capacity to impair the objectivity of Chinese internal auditors. Participants were more tolerant of management’s attempts to manage earnings when there was close guanxi or bonus compensation. Further, compensation structure only influenced internal auditors’ support of management when guanxi was distant, but when there was close guanxi between internal auditors and management, internal auditors were unlikely to challenge management regardless of the compensation structure.

Citation

Li, Y., Rose, A.M., Rose, J.M. and Tang, F. (2015), "The Effects of Guanxi and Compensation Structure on the Objectivity of Chinese Internal Auditors", Advances in Accounting Behavioral Research (Advances in Accounting Behavioural Research, Vol. 18), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 99-124. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1475-148820150000018003