The Delegation of Decision Rights: An Experimental Investigation

Abstract

Purpose

Despite the benefits of delegation, anecdotal and survey-based evidence suggests that firms do not optimally delegate decision-making authority. However, to date, no quantifiable evidence supports this claim.

Methodology/approach

We design an experiment to explore the superior’s choice between delegation and information elicitation. We also examine the effect of the superiors’ choice on the amount of effort provided by subordinates to gather decision-facilitating information.

Findings

We find that, compared to economic predictions, superiors delegate less often than they should. Subordinates exert lower effort when superiors elicit information than when superiors delegate the decision to them. As a result, superiors earn lower profit when they elicit information than when they delegate decision-making authority.

Research implications

Our empirical evidence supports two main tenets espoused in the literature on the allocation of decision rights. First, the evidence of under delegation contributes to the literature which maintains that superiors’ tendency to under-delegate leads firms to become overly centralized.

Originality/value

By designing a novel experimental, we identify systematic ways in which behavior deviates from economic theory and contribute to the discussion on how firms utilize information. In particular, under delegation prevents firms from exploiting economies that arise from local capabilities and task specialization, and results in forgone profits.

Citation

Coats, J.C. and Rankin, F.W. (2016), "The Delegation of Decision Rights: An Experimental Investigation", Advances in Management Accounting (Advances in Management Accounting, Vol. 27), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 39-71. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1474-787120160000027002