To read the full version of this content please select one of the options below:

The Delegation of Decision Rights: An Experimental Investigation

Advances in Management Accounting

ISBN: 978-1-78560-972-5, eISBN: 978-1-78560-971-8

ISSN: 1474-7871

Publication date: 23 November 2016

Abstract

Originality/value

By designing a novel experimental, we identify systematic ways in which behavior deviates from economic theory and contribute to the discussion on how firms utilize information. In particular, under delegation prevents firms from exploiting economies that arise from local capabilities and task specialization, and results in forgone profits.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

Acknowledgments

This paper has benefited from helpful insights from Sean Pfeffer, Doug Stevens, Jeremy Lill, Michael Mjerczyk, Ivo Tafkov, Flora Zhou, Stephan Kramer, Nadine Funcke, Paolo Perego, Marcel van Rinsum, and workshop participants at The University of Kentucky, Erasmus University, Georgia State University, and the 2013 Management Accounting Conference. We thank Colorado State University for providing funding for this study.

Citation

Coats, J.C. and Rankin, F.W. (2016), "The Delegation of Decision Rights: An Experimental Investigation", Advances in Management Accounting (Advances in Management Accounting, Vol. 27), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Bingley, pp. 39-71. https://doi.org/10.1108/S1474-787120160000027002

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2017 Emerald Group Publishing Limited