TY - CHAP AB - In late 2008, a crisis of unprecedented proportion unfolded on Wall Street that called for the government bailout of institutions. Although the crisis wreaked havoc on the lives of firm stakeholders and taxpayers, many of the executives of these rescued firms received bonus compensation as the year closed, which called into question the relationship between pay and performance. Equity compensation is viewed by many as the answer to the principal–agent dilemma. By giving an executive stock in the firm, as an owner, his interests will now be aligned with those of shareholders, and the executive will work to enhance firm performance. Equity compensation was on the rise during the 1990s when stock options became the largest component of executives’ compensation packages [Murphy, K. J. (1999). Executive compensation. Handbook of Labor Economics, 3, 2485–2563]. During the first decade of the new millennium, usage of restricted stock in compensation plans contributed to the executives’ total package. Whatever the form, equity compensation should induce managers to make decisions for the betterment of the firm.Empirical evidence, however, has contradicted this ideal notion that mangers who are partial owners of the firm work to maximize firm value. Rather, managerial power in the form of earnings management and manipulation of insider information come to the forefront as a means by which executives can maximize the equity portion of their compensation packages. The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as well as new accounting rules set forth by the Financial Accounting Standards Board may help to remedy some of the corporate ills that have surfaced in the past. This will not be possible, however, without compliance and increased corporate governance on the part of firms and their executives. Compensation committees must take great care in creating a compensation package that incites the executive to not only act in the best interest of his firm but also consider the welfare of the common good in his actions. VL - 15 SN - 978-1-84950-729-5, 978-1-84950-728-8/1041-7060 DO - 10.1108/S1041-7060(2010)0000015008 UR - https://doi.org/10.1108/S1041-7060(2010)0000015008 AU - Henry Theresa F. ED - Cheryl R. Lehman PY - 2010 Y1 - 2010/01/01 TI - Does equity compensation induce executives to maximize firm value or their own personal wealth? T2 - Ethics, Equity, and Regulation T3 - Advances in Public Interest Accounting PB - Emerald Group Publishing Limited SP - 111 EP - 139 Y2 - 2024/03/29 ER -