TY  - CHAP
AB  - Abstract We show that, in the US telecommunications industry, market participants have a sophisticated understanding of the political process, and behave strategically in their allocation of contributions to state legislators as if seeking to purchase influence over regulatory policy. We find that interests respond defensively to contributions from rivals, take into account the configuration of support available to them in both the legislature and the regulatory commission, and vary their contributions according to variations in relative costs for influence by different legislatures. This strategic behavior supports a theory that commercially motivated interests contribute campaign resources in order to mobilize legislators to influence the decisions of regulatory agencies. We also report evidence that restrictions on campaign finance do not affect all interests equally. The paper therefore provides positive evidence on the nature and effects of campaign contributions in regulated industries where interest group competition may be sharp.
VL  - 34
SN  - 978-1-78635-019-0, 978-1-78635-020-6/0742-3322
DO  - 10.1108/S0742-332220160000034007
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S0742-332220160000034007
AU  - de Figueiredo Rui J. P.
AU  - Edwards Geoff
PY  - 2016
Y1  - 2016/01/01
TI  - The Market for Legislative Influence over Regulatory Policy
T2  - Strategy Beyond Markets
T3  - Advances in Strategic Management
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 193
EP  - 232
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -