Chance, Preferences, and Predictions in Garbage Can Theory

Abstract

We build three stochastic models of garbage can processes in an organization populated by boundedly rational agents. Although short-run behavior in our models can be quite chaotic, they generate systematic, testable predictions about patterns of organizational choice. These predictions are determined, in fairly intuitive ways, by the degree of preference conflict among agents in the organization, by their patterns of attention, and by their tendencies to make errors. We also show that nontrivial temporal orders can arise endogenously in one of our models, but only when some form of intentional order, based on agents’ preferences, is also present.

Citation

Bendor, J. and Shotts, K.W. (2012), "Chance, Preferences, and Predictions in Garbage Can Theory", Lomi, A. and Harrison, J.R. (Ed.) The Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice: Looking Forward at Forty (Research in the Sociology of Organizations, Vol. 36), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, Leeds, pp. 99-137. https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X(2012)0000036008