TY  - CHAP
AB  - President John F. Kennedy navigated through the Cuban missile crisis with the help of his advisers in the so-called ExComm. While ExComm attendance was very stable and its goal, the removal of the missiles, clear, true to the garbage can model the options available were socially constructed and were ambiguously related to the objective they purportedly served. An analysis of the recorded discussions reveals that Kennedy's choice of a blockade required the ExComm to suppress talk about the perils it entailed; his decision not to intercept a Soviet tanker was based less on caution than unsustainable indecision; and when Kennedy squared off against his advisers regarding the best way to respond to Khrushchev's conflicting offers on October 26 and 27, the latter worked to exclude him from the very decision he was about to make. The analysis points to a natural affinity between the garbage can model and ethnomethodological attention to the fine-grained details of deliberative talk.
VL  - 36
SN  - 978-1-78052-713-0, 978-1-78052-712-3/0733-558X
DO  - 10.1108/S0733-558X(2012)0000036006
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S0733-558X(2012)0000036006
AU  - Gibson David R.
ED  - Alessandro Lomi
ED  - J. Richard Harrison
PY  - 2012
Y1  - 2012/01/01
TI  - Turn-Taking and Geopolitics in the Making of Decisions
T2  - The Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice: Looking Forward at Forty
T3  - Research in the Sociology of Organizations
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 33
EP  - 64
Y2  - 2024/04/16
ER  -