TY  - CHAP
AB  - Abstract Inefficiencies in the fiscal and monetary systems of the Ottoman Empire led to a higher debt burden over time and the bankruptcy for the Ottoman state in 1875. To deal with these inefficiencies, reforms were implemented: supervisory organizations were established and the gold standard was adopted. How did investors at the Istanbul Bourse view these reforms? We manually collected data on the price of Ottoman government bonds on the Bourse from 1873 to 1883. Using the generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) methodology, we identify short-run and permanent changes in volatility of bond returns subsequent to the reforms. Our results suggest investors responded positively, by accepting lower yield premia, to adoption of the gold standard, and foundation of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration which had European sponsors, but did not respond positively to reforms that relied on purely local institutions.
VL  - 33
SN  - 978-1-78743-120-1, 978-1-78743-119-5/0363-3268
DO  - 10.1108/S0363-326820170000033004
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S0363-326820170000033004
AU  - Hanedar Elmas Yaldız
AU  - Hanedar Avni Önder
AU  - Çelikay Ferdi
PY  - 2017
Y1  - 2017/01/01
TI  - Reforms and Supervisory Organizations: Lessons from the History of the Istanbul Bourse, 1873–1883
T2  - Research in Economic History
T3  - Research in Economic History
PB  - Emerald Publishing Limited
SP  - 115
EP  - 137
Y2  - 2024/04/25
ER  -