TY  - CHAP
AB  - Marriage is often compared to a “contract.” This analogy purports to proceed from a settled concept called “contract,” under which legitimate obligations derive from consent. The analogy creates confusion when applied in the legal context. In law, “contract” refers to a broad category of legal obligation. Many legal theorists believe “contractual” enforceability should be based solely on consent. But as a matter of positive legal doctrine, consent is neither necessary nor sufficient to establish enforceability. A contract's enforceability also depends on its relationship to public welfare.Thus the “contract” analogy does not constitute a legal justification for an approach to marriage based solely on the consent of the parties. It merely expresses a normative preference for a consent-based approach. The chapter illustrates this point using examples of current marriage-related issues, such as covenant marriage, prenuptial agreements, and same-sex marriage.
VL  - 24
SN  - 978-1-84855-335-4, 978-1-84855-334-7/0193-5895
DO  - 10.1108/S0193-5895(2009)0000024011
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-5895(2009)0000024011
AU  - Joo Thomas W.
ED  - Dana L. Gold
PY  - 2009
Y1  - 2009/01/01
TI  - The discourse of “contract” and the law of marriage
T2  - Law & Economics: Toward Social Justice
T3  - Research in Law and Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 161
EP  - 187
Y2  - 2024/05/06
ER  -