TY  - CHAP
AB  - Abstract Self-regulatory organizations (SROs) can be found in education, healthcare, and other not-for-profit sectors as well as in the accounting, financial, and legal professions. DeMarzo et al. (2005) show theoretically that SROs can create monopoly market power for their affiliated agents, but that governmental oversight, even if less efficient than oversight by the SRO, can largely offset such market power. We provide an experimental test of this conjecture. For carefully rationalized parameterizations and implementation details, we find that the predictions of DeMarzo et al. (2005) are borne out.
VL  - 19
SN  - 978-1-78560-964-0, 978-1-78560-963-3/0193-2306
DO  - 10.1108/S0193-230620160000019003
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S0193-230620160000019003
AU  - Van Koten Silvester
AU  - Ortmann Andreas
PY  - 2016
Y1  - 2016/01/01
TI  - Self-Regulatory Organizations under the Shadow of Governmental Oversight: An Experimental Investigation
T2  - Experiments in Organizational Economics
T3  - Research in Experimental Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 85
EP  - 104
Y2  - 2024/05/11
ER  -