TY  - CHAP
AB  - Abstract This paper is the first to present empirical evidence consistent with models of signaling through unemployment and to uncover a new stylized fact using the 1988–2006 Displaced Worker Supplement (DWS) of the Current Population Survey (CPS), namely that, among white-collar workers, post-displacement earnings fall less rapidly with unemployment spells for layoffs than for plant closings. Because high-productivity workers are more likely to be recalled than low-productivity ones, they may choose to signal their productivity though unemployment, in which case the duration of unemployment may be positively related to post-displacement wages. Identification is done using workers whose plant closed as they cannot be recalled, and no incentives to signal arise.
VL  - 38
SN  - 978-1-78350-056-7, 978-1-78350-057-4/0147-9121
DO  - 10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038007
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/S0147-9121(2013)0000038007
AU  - Rodríguez-Planas Núria
PY  - 2014
Y1  - 2014/01/01
TI  - Playing Hard to Get: Theory and Evidence on Layoffs, Recalls, and Unemployment
T2  - New Analyses of Worker Well-Being
T3  - Research in Labor Economics
PB  - Emerald Group Publishing Limited
SP  - 211
EP  - 258
Y2  - 2024/05/04
ER  -