Accountability as a mechanism and a virtue in Irish public sector recordkeeping

Abstract

Purpose

Although legislation and regulations form an important foundation for recordkeeping and for accountability, questions of transparency and openness must be addressed in a wider context. Oliver and Foscarini have argued for the importance of recognising differing cultures and the ways in which they value records and recordkeeping. In addition to reporting mechanisms and relationships, accountability must encompass a culture and a mindset which is transparent, responsive and focused on self-improvement. This paper aims to apply a dual interpretation of accountability in the context of Irish public sector recordkeeping to identify shortcomings and suggest potential remedies with a view to improving the accountability of Irish recordkeeping itself, and the extent to which it contributes to wider accountability in society.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper assesses accountability in Irish public sector recordkeeping using a model suggested by Mark Bovens, which views accountability as both a mechanism and a virtue. The model emphasises that both interpretations are necessary but that mechanisms (laws, regulations and checklists) on their own cannot be sufficient to satisfy accountability requirements. As noted by Onora O’Neill, the aim of accountability should not be checklists or artificial metrics, but the nurturing of behaviours and cultures which make public institutions more deserving of our trust. Reference will be made to Irish legislation, to records management policies in government departments, to relevant annual reports and to current practice with regard to appraisal and other recordkeeping functions to measure Irish public sector recordkeeping against Bovens' model.

Findings

This paper suggests that Irish public sector recordkeeping has a range of shortcomings under both the narrow (mechanism) and broad (virtue) interpretations of accountability. Lack of reporting requirements and oversight mechanisms in existing legislation allows for major gaps in public sector recordkeeping, facilitating a lack of accountability in the citizen–state relationship. Meanwhile, an absence of records management policies and an overall lack of appreciation of the value of records leads to opaque practices and a lack of transparency. The recordkeeping profession itself adopts processes and practices, which are not aligned with the concept of accountability as a virtue, and which do not reflect a commitment to transparency and meeting the legitimate interests of stakeholders. This paper suggests changes in relevant legislation but also suggests that these must be accompanied by a more open and responsive working culture within the recordkeeping profession.

Originality/value

By applying Bovens’ dual concept of accountability, this paper provides a new and more comprehensive assessment of public sector recordkeeping in Ireland, which can equally be applied in other contexts. It identifies ways in which revised legislation can contribute to greater accountability, but emphasises that regulations must be accompanied by a culture of transparency and responsiveness, and that recordkeepers have a crucial role to play in terms of their own commitment to transparency and professional accountability.

Citation

Farrell, M. (2024), "Accountability as a mechanism and a virtue in Irish public sector recordkeeping", Records Management Journal, Vol. 34 No. 2/3, pp. 190-204. https://doi.org/10.1108/RMJ-09-2023-0051

Introduction

Accountability is a frequently used, but ill-defined term. Several writers claim that, in many contexts, accountability has come to be interpreted narrowly in terms of cost-saving, with a strong focus on statistical-based performance indicators (Michael, 2005, Perrin, 2015, Ferlie, 2017). Accountability can thus lead to a concentration on bureaucratic procedures, checklists, box-ticking and league tables with the stated aim of creating more trust, but deflecting public agencies from their core focus and interfering with the delivery of services and the achievement of positive goals. If properly understood and applied, however, accountability has the potential to ensure that the state is transparent in its activities and in the manner of its interactions with citizens.

In the recordkeeping literature [1], the central role of records and archives in facilitating accountability is a constant theme (Bearman, 1995; McKemmish, 1998; Cain et al., 2001; Kemoni et al., 2007; Tough, 2008; Svärd, 2017). Several writers, however, note problems with how accountability is understood by recordkeepers. Hurley (2006, p. 85) states bluntly that claims regarding recordkeeping and accountability frequently “disappear into a fog of ambiguity and obfuscation”. Moss (2011), Cifor (2016) and Gauld (2018) all question the interpretation of accountability that links it too closely to economic efficiencies and cost savings. Given these limitations and inconsistencies, it is appropriate to look at the wider academic writing on accountability to find a model which can bring some level of clarity and consistency in the recordkeeping context.

O’Neill (2002) urges a wider understanding of accountability, stating that “much that has to be accounted for cannot be easily measured, it cannot be boiled down to a set of stock performance indicators”. Questions of democracy, corruption and learning require that any checklists, performance measurements, cost-savings or efficiencies, while important in their own contexts, must have a wider overall purpose. In addressing this need for a wider interpretation of accountability, while still recognising the requirement for appropriate levels of reporting and oversight, Bovens (2010) describes accountability as both a mechanism and a virtue. Viewed as a mechanism, accountability is a specific relationship in which an actor is obliged to explain and justify conduct to a specified forum. Viewed as a virtue, it represents “substantive norms for the behaviour of actors” (Bovens, 2010, p. 949), albeit with standards varying across a range of organisations and contexts.

Bovens refers to these two approaches as the narrow (i.e. accountability as a mechanism) and the broad (i.e. accountability as a virtue) understandings of accountability. He emphasises that the two approaches are necessary, but the mechanisms and the reporting relationships must remain a means rather than an end and the aim must be to build trustworthy public institutions that operate in an ethical manner and that are deserving of trust from the citizens.

This paper considers Bovens’ dual conceptualisation of accountability as a normative model, i.e. a standard that identifies desirable norms of behaviour. By addressing both the mechanics of reporting structures and relationships, and the wider beneficial purpose and aims of accountability, Bovens’ model provides a firm foundation for assessing recordkeeping, identifying potential shortcomings in accountability and suggesting ways to address them.

Accountability as a mechanism in Irish public sector recordkeeping

Bovens (2007, p. 450) defines accountability as a social relation in the following manner:

A relationship between an actor and a forum, in which the actor has an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct, the forum can pose questions and pass judgement, and the actor may face consequences.

Bovens is keen to emphasise the term “consequences” rather than “sanctions” or “penalties” because, he says, these latter terms imply punishment or chastisement, whereas consequences can be positive as well as negative; accountability processes can highlight and reward good performance, as well as punish bad performance (Bovens, 2010, p. 952). This reflects the “carrot and stick” and, as will be explored later, is a critical element of the broader view of accountability.

Typical relationships when observing accountability as a mechanism include those between junior civil servants and their managers, between senior civil servants and government ministers and between ministers and parliament. Under a democratic perspective of accountability, members of the public are the ultimate forum, in a position to ask questions, pass judgement and impose consequences (positive or negative) through participation in the electoral process or public debate. The reporting structures, channels of communication and lines of investigation, which exist as part of these various interlocking relationships, represent accountability as a mechanism. They are normally established through legislation or regulations, which establish a hierarchy of roles, relationships and reporting mechanisms.

Bovens’ conceptualisation will be assessed in relation to Ireland’s primary recordkeeping legislation, the National Archives Act (1986), which established the National Archives (NAI) and introduced a range of roles and functions with regards to the retention and disposal of public records, and their transfer to the NAI after 30 years. Reference will also be made to Freedom of Information (FOI) legislation and the National Archives (Amendment) Act of 2018, as well as annual reports, FOI requests and records management policies.

In making these assessments, it must be recognised that, in common with other jurisdictions, Ireland has witnessed historical shortcomings in public sector recordkeeping. O’Brien (2004) details the neglect suffered by the Public Record Office in Ireland over many decades prior to the establishment of the NAI, whereas successive annual reports of the Director of the NAI repeat verbatim that recordkeeping has been a “notable failing” of the Irish public sector, as highlighted by a series of tribunals of inquiry and by the Information Commissioner (National Archives, 2008, p. 9; National Archives, 2009, p. 7; National Archives, 2010, p. 7; National Archives, 2011, p. 5; National Archives, 2012, p. 3; National Archives, 2013, p. 3; National Archives, 2014, p. 3). The NAI is undoubtedly faced with significant challenges, in terms of the public sector recordkeeping culture, legislative constraints and resourcing restrictions, in attempting to overcome such shortcomings and address decades of neglect.

Public bodies as actors

Government departments, courts and scheduled bodies listed in the 1986 Act are required by law to transfer 30-year-old records to the NAI, where they will be made available for public inspection (certain records may be transferred after 20 years, under amending legislation introduced in 2018). In addition to the transfer of records, bodies covered by the legislation are prohibited from disposing of any records without the prior authorisation of the Director of the NAI. The legislation thus creates an apparent legal obligation in relation to the retention of records and their subsequent transfer to the NAI.

Annual reports of the Director of the NAI – a legal requirement, although the first such report under the 1986 Act relates to 1997 (National Archives, 1999) – and of the National Archives Advisory Council (NAAC) indicate a widespread disregard by the various actors for their obligations under the legislation. Most government departments have significant backlogs of records, which have not been transferred to the NAI. Meanwhile, the NAI acknowledges that disposal of public records takes place without its authorisation and that it has no facility for preventing this or for seeking explanations from those responsible (National Archives, 2021b). So while the obligation to take certain actions is specified in the legislation, there is no corresponding obligation for actors to explain or justify their conduct.

The legislation contains no specific reporting or communications channels. It does not, for example, say that the NAI may demand, or even request, explanations from scheduled bodies in the event of non-compliance. It would be natural to presume that NAI is in a position to “pose questions and pass judgements” in the form of day-to-day contacts and communications, although there is no evidence of it in annual reports or other publicly-available sources. This may be due partly to a reluctance to alienate government departments and partly to the lack of any formal facility within the legislation for holding non-compliant actors to account.

Apart from the lack of regular transfers of records to the NAI, the lack of accountability extends into other areas of the Act also, including the continued withholding of records from public access after they reach the 30-year threshold. In such cases, the relevant department or scheduled body must apply not to the NAI, but to the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime Minister). There is no requirement to publish requests for withholding of records or to publicise them in any other way. Nor is there any review or appeal process, other than a routine requirement for the relevant department to review the need to withhold the records every five years. Members of the public seeking information about withholding of records are restricted to the use of FOI requests to elicit the information they desire; even then, the response can be opaque and inconsistent with FOI and the principles of transparency (Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media, 2023).

Finally, there is no evidence that any actor will face consequences, either positive or negative, as a result of their actions in relation to the National Archives Act. Annual reports of the Director do include lists of which bodies have or have not transferred records. While this may be seen as a form of sanction (i.e. naming and shaming, as it were, those who do not transfer), the lists are included without comment or criticism, and thus any sanction is of the mildest form possible. Furthermore, the text of successive annual reports makes it clear that at least some of the responsibility for lack of transfers lies with the lack of storage space available in the NAI, thus making it impossible to assess whether individual agencies have attempted to transfer their records or not. For example, the Director’s report for 2020 states: “As in previous years, several Departments have been asked to retain records which we are unable to accept” (National Archives, 2021a, p. 22). This highlights that accountability is heavily influenced not only by deficiencies in legislation but also by operational challenges faced by the NAI as a result of resourcing issues, as noted repeatedly by the NAAC (National Archives Advisory Council, 2001, p. 14; National Archives Advisory Council, 2013, p. 8; National Archives Advisory Council, 2019, p. 7) and by a comparative survey conducted in 2019 (Creative Cultures and Associates, 2019).

In reviewing all of the above, it can be said that, in the context of Bovens’ framework of accountability as a mechanism, there appears to be limited effective accountability in the relationship between the NAI and the agencies which come within the remit of the legislation. Although public agencies covered by the Act have a legal obligation to undertake certain tasks (e.g. transfer 30-year-old records) and to refrain from certain other tasks (e.g. disposing of records without authorisation), there appears to be no obligation on them to explain and justify their actions, the NAI has no meaningful facility to pose questions and pass judgment and there are no means for ensuring that the actor faces any consequences for non-compliance.

The wider potential implications of this are that the public is denied access to public records without explanation, without the possibility of review or appeal and without external checks or balances. This has a direct impact on public sector accountability.

NAI as an actor.

As well as being a forum in an accountability mechanism, as described above, the NAI can also be viewed as an actor, answerable to its parent department, to government and parliament as a whole and, ultimately, to the general public. The NAI is currently part of the Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media and is thus directly responsible to the Minister rather than to any oversight board. The 1986 Act established a NAAC, with a role in advising the Minister “in the exercise of his powers under this Act, and on all matters affecting archives and their use by the public” (National Archives Act, 1986, S.20). Annual reports suggest that the NAAC currently takes a conservative interpretation of this role; its report for 2020 refers to “our role in advocating for the National Archives” (National Archives Advisory Council, 2021, p. 3), although the Act makes no reference to such a role for the NAAC.

Earlier annual reports of the Council displayed a greater willingness to comment directly on the performance of the various public bodies which are subject to the Act. The very first annual report of the NAAC stated that the Council’s role “is both supervisory and advisory” (National Archives Advisory Council, 1990, p. 7). In its second report, the NAAC stated that “it considers that it should draw attention to those Departments where there has been a spectacular failure to transfer records” and goes on to comment on the performance of specific departments and agencies (National Archives Advisory Council, 1992, p. 12).

Early incarnations of the NAAC, therefore, appear to have taken a more interventionist approach than more recent ones. The phrase used in the Act itself – to “advise on all matters affecting archives and their use by the public” – seems to have been interpreted in an increasingly restrictive and limited fashion as time has passed. In fact, there appears to be little if any accountability relationship between the NAI and any sort of independent or semi-autonomous forum; the NAAC seems to play no role in posing questions and passing judgement in relation to the NAI. Although it may be desirable and welcome that the NAAC supports, advocates for or represents the views of the NAI, the legislation does not appear to confine its role to such tasks.

The term “advisory” in NAAC’s title gives a clue as to its limited remit. It is not an oversight body with powers to ask questions, demand answers and pass judgement. Nevertheless, the interpretation of “advisory” in an increasingly narrow sense means that there is no agency which passes public comment or provides an assessment of the performance of the NAI. Although it may certainly be appropriate that the NAAC should advocate for the NAI in efforts to secure more funding, more storage and increased levels of staffing, it is also valid for questions to be asked about whether the NAI can carry out its duties more effectively, more transparently and in a manner which better fulfils its responsibilities to its stakeholders, including researchers and the public at large.

In terms of accountability to the public at large, as distinct from a specific oversight body, annual reports present a limited insight into the work of the NAI. They describe what the NAI has done, but do not provide explanations of the basis on which important operational decisions were made. As such, they can be said to meet the standards expected of an actor in an accountability relationship in a limited way, with little or no input from stakeholders, and limited information available to the public.

There is no facility for members of the public to pose questions about the actions of the NAI, except in a retrospective manner after decisions are taken. In recent years, a list of decisions to approve or refuse applications for disposal of records is published in the Director’s annual report, but this is a retrospective list, which offers no rationale for decisions made. By the time an annual report is published, it is too late for the public to influence actions or decisions. There is no evidence that any of these decisions are subject to discussion, scrutiny or review by anyone outside the NAI. There is apparently no facility for stakeholder input or consultation as part of this appraisal process, nor for any appeal or review mechanism prior to the disposal of records. There is no intention here to suggest that these decisions are flawed or inappropriate, but there is a lack of accountability, oversight or transparency associated with the process and the public can only have knowledge of the reasoning behind a decision to retain or dispose of public records retrospectively, via FOI requests. Even then, significant details are likely to be redacted (Department of Tourism et al., 2022).

Gaps in accountability as a mechanism

Non-scheduled bodies

As noted repeatedly by the National Archives Advisory Council (2000, p. 19; National Archives Advisory Council, 2006, p. 14; National Archives Advisory Council, 2013, p. 7), one of the obvious shortcomings with the National Archives Act is that many significant public bodies fall completely outside the remit of the legislation. These include, for example, semi-state agencies, which have had a significant role in the development of the social, economic and cultural life of the nation over many decades. They include public companies that have since been privatised, and also significant public enterprises established since 1986 and that have a major bearing on some of the most significant events in the history of the nation and its citizens. An illustrative sample would include major public agencies in the health care, justice, environment and financial management sectors. North-South bodies, established on an all-Ireland basis under the Good Friday Agreement of 1998, also fall outside the remit of the National Archives Act.

The NAI itself estimates that over 150 public bodies are not covered by the legislation and, as such, have no obligation to transfer records to the NAI, and no obligation to seek authorisation from the Director of the NAI before disposal of their records takes place (National Archives, 2021b). The gaps in public accountability arising from this are obvious. A large number of public agencies, including many of those central to the rights and well-being of Irish citizens and residents, have no legal obligations with regard to the management, safeguarding, preserving and accessibility of their records. As such, they are free to do as they wish with their records, from the point of creation to the point of disposal, and members of the public have no facility to access such records, save through the limited provisions of FOI or Data Protection legislation, or the voluntary goodwill of the relevant agencies.

2018 National Archives (Amendment) Act.

The National Archives (Amendment) Act of 2018 introduced a facility for certain records to be transferred to the NAI when they reach 20 years old, rather than 30 years old. This was introduced as a specific response to a similar change in the UK, which resulted in UK records relating to Northern Ireland and Anglo-Irish relations being released several years before the corresponding Irish records. Rather than move towards a universal 20-year rule applying to all records, the 2018 Amendment Act introduced a facility for the Minister to designate certain records as “relevant records” and therefore suitable for release after 20 years.

The criteria for assessing which records fall into the category of “relevant records” includes that the records concerned “are of significant historical or public interest” or that their transfer to the NAI “will facilitate the balanced and fair reporting of matters of common interest to the State and other jurisdictions” (National Archives (Amendment) Act, 2018, S. 4). Furthermore, it states that in designating records as suitable for transfer after 20 years, the Minister must consult the Director of the NAI and must secure the consent of the Taoiseach, the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform and the relevant line minister (e.g. the Minister for Justice in the case of records originating in the Department of Justice).

All of this introduces a significant political element into decisions relating to the release of public records. Although an order identifying certain records for release after 20 years must be placed before the Houses of the Oireachtas (national parliament), there is no facility for questioning how records were assessed as either having or lacking significant historical or public interest, nor for questioning a decision not to release records after 20 years. Neither is there a facility for identifying, for example, instances where one Minister consented to release but another Minister, or the Taoiseach, objected.

In referring to the release of records to facilitate “the balanced and fair reporting of matters of common interest to the State and other jurisdictions”, the 2018 Amendment Act prioritises records from certain departments and relating to certain areas of policy. It seems likely, therefore, that with limited resources available, records relating to other governmental responsibilities (finance, education, health, environment and so on), will fall further back in the queue and will continue to accumulate without being transferred to the NAI. In simple terms, selective release of public records on the basis of subjective political assessments is not compatible with effective accountability.

Summary: accountability as a mechanism

Interpreting accountability as a mechanism should result in a network of reporting relationships and assessment criteria whereby relevant forums and the public at large can ask questions, receive explanations and pass judgement and have the opportunity to reward or penalise, depending on the outcome of the accountability process. Bovens states that in studies of accountability as a mechanism, gaps and shortcomings will be manifested as flaws or loopholes in the control mechanisms. The assessment above has identified several such flaws in Irish public sector recordkeeping.

These flaws can be addressed by a range of legislative changes, including giving the NAI greater scope to hold public bodies to account and to seek explanation and justification for recordkeeping decisions across the public sector. Gaps in accountability can be addressed by bringing more public bodies within the remit of the legislation, so that they have legal obligations regarding the creation, management, retention and accessibility of their records. Oversight of the entire recordkeeping process can be facilitated by creating a council or agency with more authority than the NAAC, and an ability to play an effective role as an accountability forum as defined by Bovens.

Although it represented a major improvement on what was previously in place, widespread non-compliance with the 1986 Act means that many of its provisions have not resulted in the benefits originally envisaged. It could be said that more rigid rules and greater levels of oversight provide a straightforward way to address this. However, viewing accountability only as a mechanism by which laws can be more rigidly enforced will always have limited success. The key to greater compliance lies in a wider understanding of accountability, one with a focus on engagement and awareness rather than purely on enforcement mechanisms.

Accountability as a virtue in Irish public sector recordkeeping

Although accountability as a mechanism is concerned with reporting structures and relationships, accountability as a virtue in the public sector environment is concerned with the outlook, demeanour and behaviour of public sector agencies. It refers to a set of substantive norms for the behaviour of actors, which Bovens likens to “a willingness to act in a transparent, fair, and equitable way” (Bovens, 2010, p.949). Torrance defines the virtue of accountability as “the disposition that characterises the person who embraces the condition of being accountable” (Torrance, 2021, p. 313). He views accountability as a relationship that enables a person to learn from another, to respond to comments and opinions and to improve themselves as individuals. This approach views accountability as very much a process of responsiveness and improvement. It cannot be present without openness and transparency, a willingness to share information and to learn from the opinions and views of others in the relationship. It requires a demeanour or a character which is open to scrutiny, learning and self-improvement, rather than an outlook which is closed, defensive and resistant to outside influences.

In encouraging this kind of broader understanding of accountability, O’Neill argues that societies which are closed or restrictive are dysfunctional, even where they have rigid reporting, control and accountability systems in place. She writes of “enclave cultures” where professions and institutions stifle debate and discourage the exploration of varied ways of understanding situations and meeting relevant requirements (O’Neill, 2017, p. 407). She concludes that legislation, regulation and systems of accountability are not enough on their own; they need the support of ethical, trustworthy and effective work cultures (O’Neill, 2017, p. 411).

Blagescu et al. (2005, p. 11), in their Global Accountability Framework (GAF), share in the broad interpretation of accountability, describing it as “less a mechanism of control and more a process for learning”, which “provides a pathway to better performance”. The GAF states that a retrospective assessment or judgement of actions already taken is too narrow a focus for accountability, and that there is a need to look “beyond its role as a disciplinary mechanism and towards its use as a transformative process” (Blagescu et al., 2005, p. 19). This is why annual reports, for example, are of limited benefit in accountability terms – they provide information on what has already happened and do not facilitate stakeholder engagement and input.

Bovens states that assessing accountability as a virtue can formulate standards for the behaviour of public agencies: they should be open, engage in dialogue and be willing to learn. In practice, this translates to visible policies developed with the input of stakeholders, voluntary and comprehensive explanations of actions and decisions, and active engagement with the views and opinions of relevant interested parties. Studies which identify shortcomings in accountability as a virtue may highlight behaviour which is “unresponsive, opaque, irresponsible, ineffective, or even deviant” (Bovens, 2010, p. 959).

The following sections address the presence or absence of such a culture within Irish public sector recordkeeping as a whole before assessing the degree to which the recordkeeping profession, through its own conduct and procedures, meets the broad understanding of accountability as a virtue.

Public sector bodies

Oliver and Foscarini (2020) highlight that cultural attitudes, including national cultures, have an impact in a recordkeeping context. Where the culture has been traditionally less accepting of recordkeeping, “where respect for and understanding of records and recordkeeping processes cannot be taken for granted, or where the act of documenting is perceived as negative behaviour, the records manager can appear to be faced with insurmountable difficulties” (Oliver and Foscarini, 2020, p. 36). Such a scenario appears to aptly describe the traditional culture of recordkeeping in the Irish public sector, as outlined earlier in this article.

Accountability as a virtue requires openness about strategies, policies and procedures – not just their content, but how they came to be developed and who had input into them. One way of embracing accountability as a virtue in the recordkeeping context, therefore, is for government departments and other public agencies to adopt and share recordkeeping policies and procedures, which are not only available to stakeholders but which are influenced by and encompass the views and needs of those stakeholders. The National Archives Act of 1986 allows the Minister for Public Expenditure to issue regulations “for the proper management and preservation of Departmental records in the custody or care of a Department of State” (National Archives Act, 1986, Section 19). The Freedom of Information Act (2014) contains a similar provision (Section 8). No such regulations have ever been issued, however, with the result that there are no consistent policies or regulations in place in the civil service for the creation, management and use of public records. The NAI can issue guidelines, but not regulations, another factor that inhibits its remit under the current legislative arrangements. The lack of regulation has been noted repeatedly. The Director’s annual report for 2014, for example, stated: “My predecessors have consistently highlighted the importance of developing best practice for records management across the civil and public service […] and I must reiterate the long-standing and pressing need for Regulations by the Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform in this area” (National Archives, 2015, p. 5).

The lack of policy and associated guidelines means that recordkeeping within government departments and agencies is subject to local preferences and personal habits. Such a lack of clear policy and procedures not only restricts members of the public in accessing information and exercising their rights but also places limits on their knowledge and understanding of how public sector agencies manage records in the first place. This is contrary to the understanding of accountability as a virtue, which requires a willingness to be transparent, to be subject to scrutiny and to be responsive to the needs and contributions of stakeholders, all with a view to fostering a culture of improvement and learning.

The opaque nature of recordkeeping within government departments is illustrated by responses to a FOI request submitted as part of this research, requesting copies of records management policies [2]. Of the 16 government departments that responded to the request, eight had no central records management policy of any sort (as of 6 September 2022), one had a policy which had not been updated since 2008 and one issued a set of procedural guidelines and referred to it as a policy, although it is in effect a user guide to a document management software system.

The absence of policies in many departments may reflect the absence of professional recordkeeping staff; it is only recently that government departments have begun appointing archivists or records managers. However, many of those departments without professional recordkeeping staff do in fact have some sort of policy in place, so the correlation between policy and professional staff is not a direct one. The overall lack of policies indicates a widespread lack of priority afforded to recordkeeping. Where policies do exist, they are limited and focus on procedural matters rather than identifying the key role of records in the lives of citizens. No policy identifies any external stakeholders, apart from three generic references to “citizens”, and there is no reference to stakeholder input or participation in policy development or implementation [3]. Any notion of modern recordkeeping concepts such as person-centred or participatory recordkeeping is entirely absent from these policies.

Interpreting accountability as a virtue involves a recognition that policies and guidelines on their own will never be sufficient to ensure accountability. The GAF makes it clear, however, that visible polices are necessary in order to provide a context and a culture within which public service organisations operate and fulfil their duties to the public. Clear policies establish priorities for the organisation and its staff. The absence of records management policies in Irish public sector organisations highlights the need for greater understanding and greater appreciation of the role of recordkeeping. The importance of quality and reliable information is not to the forefront in the Irish public sector; records are often viewed as a bureaucratic encumbrance rather than as positive tools of engagement with concrete benefits for a range of stakeholders, both internal and external.

Recordkeeping professionals

If a positive culture of recordkeeping is to take hold within public service organisations, in such a manner that accountability in the broad sense of a virtue is to become widely appreciated and embedded, recordkeepers would seem to have a particular role to play. That role is one of advocacy and education, encouraging their fellow public servants to adopt the notion of accountability as a virtue via open and effective recordkeeping policies and practices which would have beneficial results in terms of transparency, responsiveness, inclusion and the re-balancing of interests to accommodate the needs of vulnerable or marginalised stakeholders. Insistence on new legislation, new rules and new penalties for non-compliance can only go so far and must be accompanied by a positive encouragement and nurturing of the value of records and archives.

Existing levels of transparency and responsiveness within the recordkeeping profession itself, however, appear to be limited at best. This can be most clearly illustrated with reference to one of the key functions of archivists, i.e. the appraisal of records to identify those which warrant long-term preservation.

Records appraisal

Appraisal endows recordkeepers with significant power and responsibility with regards to what should be remembered and what will be forgotten. According to Cline (2021), decisions by archivists with regard to appraisal “must be informed by an understanding of, and obligation to, civic virtue; personal, professional, and community values; and moral and ethical action” (Cline, p. 96). Decisions such as this should not be taken in the absence of visible criteria and policies, nor without transparency as to how and why the decisions are made, nor without some degree of input from and consultation with those stakeholders most affected by such decisions.

A review of annual reports of the Director of the NAI since 2010 shows a limited capacity on the part of the NAI to address records appraisal, due to a shortage of resources. Reports up to 2017 contain very superficial statements regarding the authorisations issued by the NAI for government departments to dispose of records, with minimal detail and no insight into what records were disposed of or on what grounds, leaving stakeholders in the dark about the nature of the records in question, why they were deemed not to be of ongoing value, or what factors influenced such a decision [4]. The NAI established a Current Records Unit in 2018 “to cater for the development of a coherent strategy and operational capacity” and to address a backlog of applications for disposal “some of which had been outstanding for a number of years” (National Archives, 2020, p.26). This has resulted in greater levels of engagement with government departments and more recent annual reports provide an itemised list of applications to dispose of records. These, however, still provide limited information or context about the content of the actual records and no explanation of the basis on which authorisations to dispose were granted.

Crucially, the annual reports provide information on decisions already taken and possibly already implemented. There is no scope for stakeholder input, review, appeal, feedback or re-consideration based on representations made. An FOI request, submitted as part of this research, for copies of appraisal reports resulted in a limited release of heavily-redacted reports, so that the nature of the information contained in records disposed of was not visible. The same FOI request also established that the NAI has no appraisal policy or criteria on which it makes appraisal decisions and by which its own actions can be assessed and measured (Department of Tourism, Culture, Arts, Gaeltacht, Sport and Media, 2022).

The absence of such policies or criteria means that questions arise about the disposal of public records. There is no intention here to question the professionalism, ability, skills or motivations of the NAI in making these decisions, nor is it suggested that any specific appraisal decisions are flawed or dubious. As noted throughout this article, the NAI operates under a series of legislative shortcomings and resource limitations, which limit its scope for action in a number of ways. Nevertheless, such restrictions do not appear to preclude the development of policy statements, and, as would be expected of any public service organisation, the NAI has polices relating to several of its areas of operation (National Archives, 2024, Policies). Appraisal decisions, however, are made in the absence of any visible written or defined policy, criteria or guidelines. There is apparently no stakeholder input and only the bare bones of each decision, i.e. the final outcome, is eventually communicated through an annual report, which is published many months after the decision has been taken. If there has been any stakeholder consultation, or any element of participatory recordkeeping as part of the appraisal process, this would presumably be made known. As it stands, it seems that stakeholders have no opportunity to engage in any of the elements identified by the GAF as necessary features of a broad interpretation of accountability, i.e. transparency, participation, evaluation and complaint and response mechanisms.

The GAF states that “A transparent organisation is open about how it makes decisions and how stakeholders can input into these. It discloses outputs from, records of and information that informed its decision-making process” (Blagescu et al., 2005, p. 31). By this measure, the NAI can be criticised for failing to display the characteristics of an organisation which embraces accountability as a virtue. This has important potential consequences for users of archives and for the wider public in terms of their ability to access records, understand how and why public agencies make decisions and hold those agencies to account. If embracing accountability as a virtue, the NAI itself would engage in a responsive learning process in relation to such questions and, in doing so, would set an example for government departments and other public agencies in how to incorporate a broad concept of accountability into their recordkeeping processes.

Other functions

Although the focus above has been on the appraisal process, a similar assessment can be made regarding other recordkeeping functions. Transparency is also lacking, for example, regarding the withholding of 30-year-old records from public access, a process in which the NAI itself is a bystander, having no role other than to receive a copy of the certificate approving the withholding application. Even here, however, the NAI takes an unnecessarily opaque approach – when asked via an FOI request for copies of such certificates, it refused to release them on the basis that doing so would cause the originating departments to refuse to co-operate with the NAI in future. Those departments, however, which had withheld the records in the first place, were happy to release the certificates without question, but with appropriate redactions to protect sensitive information, thus negating the NAI’s grounds for non-release and providing a distinct contrast to the NAI’s more reticent outlook (Department of Children, Equality, Disability, Integration and Youth, 2023, Department of Defence, 2023).

Equivalent organisations in other jurisdictions provide a clue as to how accountability as a virtue can be recognised and adopted, incorporating work processes which can be more transparent, and including opportunities for stakeholders to participate in and influence decisions. New Zealand legislation requires that at least 30 days’ notice must be given of an intention to authorise the disposal of public records (Public Records Act, 2005, Section 20), while in the UK, the Advisory Council on National Records and Archives provides an independent assessment of applications to withhold records from public access (Advisory Council, 2022). The lack of any similar provisions for oversight, appeals, exchange of views or responsiveness in the Irish context reflects a mindset which appears to be reliant on internal justification, rather than open and welcoming of discussion, input and influences from relevant stakeholders.

In overall terms, the general absence of visible policies, the lack of stakeholder opportunities to contribute towards or ask questions of core activities and decisions, and the general lack of openness and transparency in recordkeeping processes can be said to reflect O’Neill’s concerns about “enclave cultures” where professions operate in a culture of “we know best” and are limited in their willingness or ability to reflect, respond to or learn from interactions with stakeholders in the outside world.

Summary: accountability as a virtue

Accountability as a virtue requires a willingness to be open to scrutiny, to share and explain strategies and policies, to be inclusive of stakeholder needs and concerns and to strive for improvement. As described by Bovens, O’Neill, and others, it places a focus on the behaviour of actors, and the aim is trustworthy public agencies acting to a certain set of ethical norms. Blagescu et al. provide a model for assessing the extent of such trustworthy behaviour by placing an emphasis on the presence of visible policies, developed with stakeholder involvement and with ongoing scrutiny, re-evaluation and improvement.

Many of the shortcomings identified here can be addressed within existing legislative frameworks. The adoption of records management policies with stakeholder input across government departments can provide greater visibility and bring increased levels of understanding and trust. By developing a visible and robust appraisal policy, the NAI can bring greater clarity and appreciation of its role and can accommodate stakeholder needs with regards to record retention and disposal, thus facilitating greater levels of scrutiny, feedback and consultation. Undoubtedly, such changes have resource implications. Other changes will require legislative updates in order to facilitate greater transparency in a range of recordkeeping activities – for example, adapting the New Zealand and UK models in relation to appraisal and withholding of records, respectively, for application in an Irish context.

If public servants as a whole are to be encouraged to adopt a more positive, affirmative approach, the recordkeeping profession itself, through visible and substantive policies, engagement with stakeholders and a willingness to be accountable, needs to lead by example and to recognise and embrace the concept of accountability as a virtue.

Conclusion

This article has used a dual concept of accountability proposed by Bovens and applied it to Irish public sector recordkeeping. It has focused on the National Archives Act, and has not addressed recordkeeping in the local authority or wider public sector environments, areas where there is scope for similar assessments to be conducted.

The complementary concepts of accountability as a mechanism and as a virtue recognise that monitoring, reporting and investigating are necessary features of accountability but that the overall objective should be to engender more trustworthy public institutions which act from a set of fundamental values and beliefs. By viewing accountability in the broader sense, public service agencies can become more willing to open themselves to scrutiny, to accommodate stakeholder views and concerns and to become more responsive to the needs of the public.

In assessing accountability as a mechanism in Irish public sector recordkeeping, shortcomings have been identified in the necessary relationships and reporting structures, with a limited capacity on the part of the various forums to ask questions of and secure responses from relevant actors. This is in line with Bovens’ contention that this type of assessment may discover failings which manifest themselves as deficits in the network of procedures and mechanisms.

With reference to accountability as a virtue, the lack of visible and inclusive recordkeeping policies, the lack of recognition of external stakeholders, the absence of participatory recordkeeping and the minimal retrospective reporting of decisions taken without stakeholder input all suggest a system which is limited in terms of responsiveness and self-improvement. This reflects Bovens’ statement that shortcomings in accountability as a virtue may manifest themselves as opaque and unresponsive work practices and working cultures.

Regardless of the particular perspective, the ultimate aim of accountability is enabling the citizenry to make judgements about the performance of the government and facilitating an improved and more responsive governing authority which protects citizens and acts in the interests of society as a whole.

If accountability in Irish public sector agencies is to improve, better recordkeeping will play a crucial part. Apart from changes to legislation, procedures, and regulations which address the narrow interpretation of accountability, this will also require a cultural change whereby public servants have a greater appreciation of the value of records and their core role in the lives of citizens, as well as a greater willingness to include stakeholders in decisions regarding records creation, use and appraisal. The recordkeeping profession itself, in the context of those agencies and institutions assessed above, has a central role to play in advocating for such a change in culture, but currently falls short in terms of its own approach, and will need to adopt a demeanour which is more embracing of accountability as a virtue, if it is to act as advocate for greater accountability in the wider public service.

Notes

1. “Recordkeeping” and “recordkeepers” are used throughout this article as shorthand for “archivists and records managers” and “archives and records management”. Depending on the context, individual terms such as “archives” “archivists” or “records” may be used.

2. FOI request submitted on 9 August 2022 to 18 government departments in existence on that date. No response was received from the Department of Rural and Community Development. The response from the Department of Education stated that its policies also applied to the Department of Further and Higher Education, Research, Innovation and Science and thus no response was received from the latter.

3. Three policies mention “citizens” (once each) and five use the term “stakeholders”. Only one policy (the Department of Defence) actually identifies any stakeholders, however, and this refers only to internal stakeholders, as follows: “This policy applies to all employees of the Department of Defence. It also applies to secondees, interns, work experience students, and any other agent who creates, processes, or manages Departmental records or data”.

4. For example, the annual report for 2010 (p. 27) merely states: “In 2010, three authorisations for the destruction of records were granted in relation to records of the Department of Finance and the Public Appointments Service”.