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Product market competition and corporate investment decisions

Indrarini Laksmana (Department of Accounting, Kent State University, Kent, Ohio, USA)
Ya-wen Yang (School of Business, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, USA)

Review of Accounting and Finance

ISSN: 1475-7702

Article publication date: 11 May 2015

7949

Abstract

Purpose

The study aims to examine the association between product market competition and corporate investment decisions on, particularly, risk-taking and investment efficiency. Existing theoretical studies on whether product market competition mitigates or exacerbates agency problems are inconclusive. Prior research generally finds that competition constrains management opportunism in reporting operating performance. However, the association between product market competition and managerial investment decisions has largely been unexplored.

Design/methodology/approach

The primary measure of product market competition is the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index. The authors use regression analysis to examine the association between corporate risk-taking and over-investment of free cash flow (FCF) (as dependent variables) and product market competition (as an independent variable).

Findings

Using firm-year observations from 1990 to 2010, the authors find that competition encourages managers to invest in risky investment. They also find that competition disciplines management on its use of FCFs. Overall, their results provide support for the disciplining role of product market competition in management investment decisions. The results are robust after they control for shareholder activism and executive compensations.

Originality/value

The paper contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the disciplining role of product market competition in management investment decisions. First, the results suggest that competition encourages managers to invest in risky investment. One potential explanation for the results is that competition reduces opportunities for resource diversion for management personal benefits and, in turn, decreases management risk aversion. Another explanation is that competition forces management to take more risks for the long-term survival of the company. Second, the results indicate that competition disciplines management on its use of FCFs. Although firms in highly competitive industries make investment decisions that are less conservative, they tend to avoid suboptimal investment decisions, such as over-investment of FCF, compared to their counterparts.

Keywords

Citation

Laksmana, I. and Yang, Y.-w. (2015), "Product market competition and corporate investment decisions", Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 14 No. 2, pp. 128-148. https://doi.org/10.1108/RAF-11-2013-0123

Publisher

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Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2015, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

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