This paper aims to investigate whether a high level of voluntary disclosure attracts sell-side analysts. In other words, the authors check whether the number of analysts following a given firm increases with the extent of voluntary information that corporate managers provide in annual reports.
The paper relies on regression analyses to study the relationship between the level of coverage by sell-side analysts and the extent of voluntary disclosure for a sample of 155 non-financial firms listed on the Euronext Paris stock exchange and members of the SBF 250 index.
The empirical results show that the number of analysts following a given firm increases with the extent of voluntary disclosure. Consequently, the authors conclude that analysts are interested in the volume of information provided voluntarily by corporate managers. Their interest varies across the voluntary-information categories (strategic, financial, non-financial and governance) disclosed in annual reports.
This study extends previous research by investigating sell-side analysts’ preferences in terms of voluntary-information categories in annual reports. A better understanding of the effects of sub-categories of voluntary information is useful to corporate managers wishing to meet market expectations and attract sell-side analysts. In fact, the authors verify how each category of disclosed information (strategic, financial, non-financial and governance) affects the analyst coverage intensity. In addition, the authors apply our study in the rather interesting empirical setting that is France, which is characterized by a low investor protection and a large number of active analysts.
Hamrouni, A., Benkraiem, R. and Karmani, M. (2017), "Voluntary information disclosure and sell-side analyst coverage intensity", Review of Accounting and Finance, Vol. 16 No. 2, pp. 260-280. https://doi.org/10.1108/RAF-02-2015-0024
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