Corporate payout-form: investors’ preference and catering theory

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to develop and validate new robust measures of investors’ preference for the form of regular corporate payout. Then, the paper adds to the empirical evidence on catering theory by examining managers’ catering to such preference.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors use the matching method to control for firm characteristics. The authors apply two robustness tests to validate the measures. The authors use the rigorous multivariate analysis.

Findings

US investors’ preference for regular dividends vs regular stock repurchases, being different forms of corporate payout, varies over time. Managers cater to investors’ preference for payout form. The findings are consistent with the catering theory of Baker and Wurgler (2004a). The number of firms that pay cash dividends regularly continue to outnumber the ones that purchase their shares regularly.

Research limitations/implications

The study only uses US data. It does not cover other countries.

Practical implications

The measures can be used in several future research endeavors, such as examining investors’ payout-form preferences in other countries (see Booth and Zhou, 2017) and exploring their determinants, the corporate governance characteristics of firms that cater to investors’ preference vs firms that do not, etc.

Social implications

The study contributes to understanding investors’ preferences and corporate payout behavior which is prerequisite to efficient policy formulation.

Originality/value

The proxies for investors’ payout-form preference control for firm characteristics and are unrelated to investors’ time-varying risk preferences. Also, they are robust to measurement issues. Moreover, the study covers a period of 40 years.

Citation

Chazi, A., Theodossiou, A. and Zantout, Z. (2018), "Corporate payout-form: investors’ preference and catering theory", Managerial Finance, Vol. 44 No. 12, pp. 1418-1433. https://doi.org/10.1108/MF-03-2018-0127