To read the full version of this content please select one of the options below:

Optimal decision methods in two-echelon logistic models

Junzo Watada (Graduate School of Information, Production and Systems, Waseda University, Kitakyushu, Japan)
Thisana Waripan (Graduate School of Information, Production and Systems, Waseda University, Kitakyushu, Japan)
Berlin Wu (Department of Mathematical Sciences, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan)

Management Decision

ISSN: 0025-1747

Article publication date: 12 August 2014

1624

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate optimal decision methods under a cooperative situation in two-echelon logistic models.

Design/methodology/approach

The authors propose the optimal strategies of exporters in the three types of rival game behaviors: Stackelberg, Collusion, and Cournot, each of which provides the optimal decision for the duopolistic shippers and the oligopolistic forwarders in each scenario.

Findings

From the empirical studies the paper finds that among three scenarios, the oligopolistic treatment of forwarders’ actions demonstrates that Stackelberg behavior can carry out the maximum profit, and Collusion game can achieve the maximum profit for the shippers.

Originality/value

Proposed an optimal decision methods in two-echelon logistic models.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

This research was partly supported by Waseda University Global COE Program “International Research and Education Center for Ambient SOC” sponsored by MEXT, Japan.

Citation

Watada, J., Waripan, T. and Wu, B. (2014), "Optimal decision methods in two-echelon logistic models", Management Decision, Vol. 52 No. 7, pp. 1273-1287. https://doi.org/10.1108/MD-03-2013-0139

Publisher

:

Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2014, Emerald Group Publishing Limited

Related articles