Public sector audit in the absence of political competition
ISSN: 0268-6902
Article publication date: 25 October 2017
Issue publication date: 15 November 2017
Abstract
Purpose
The paper aims to explore whether different models of public sector audit exist in China without adhering to the goals and objectives of public sector audit systems in democratic jurisdictions.
Design/methodology/approach
The study is based on a single embedded case study involving multiple methods of data collection including public documents, semi-structured interviews and site visits. The research methods and the analytical framework of the study draw on the concepts of political competition, public sector accountability and audit independence.
Findings
The study finds that the Chinese National Audit Office’s (CNAO) objectives derive from the neo-classical economic discourse and not from ideas of public accountability, as is the case in democratic parliamentary jurisdictions. The study finds that public sector audit in China functions in ways which are similar to that of internal audit. The CNAO may provide limited political and public accountability for Chinese public officials indirectly by enhancing their managerial accountabilities.
Research limitations/implications
The study goes against the prevailing view that supreme audit institutions which are part of the executive will lead to poor accountability of the public sector and increased public sector corruption.
Practical implications
The study suggests that enhancing managerial accountability in non-democratic (and pseudo-democratic) jurisdictions through public sector audit can by itself be of significant benefit. Further, such enhancements may also strengthen public sector accountability.
Originality/value
This paper fills a research gap by exploring public sector audit independence in a developing country with a unitary system of government.
Keywords
Citation
Mir, M., Fan, H. and Maclean, I. (2018), "Public sector audit in the absence of political competition", Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 32 No. 9, pp. 899-923. https://doi.org/10.1108/MAJ-03-2016-1357
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2017, Emerald Publishing Limited