A computational theory of consciousness: qualia and the hard problem

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to contribute to the formulation of a theory of consciousness based only on computational processes. In this manner, sound computational explanations of qualia and the “hard problem” of consciousness are provided in response to a lack of physical, chemical and psychological explanations.

Design/methodology/approach

The study analyses the little that can be objectively known about qualia, and proposes a process that imitates the same effects. Then it applies the process to a robot (using a thought experiment) to understand whether this would produce the same sensations as humans experience.

Findings

A computational explanation of qualia and the “hard problem” of consciousness is possible through computational processes.

Research limitations/implications

This is a proposal, subject to argumentation and proof. It is a falsifiable theory, meaning that it is possible to test or reject it, as its computational basis allows for a future implementation.

Practical implications

Subjective feeling emerges as an evolutionary by-product when there are no strong evolutionary pressures on the brain. Qualia do not involve magic. These aspects of consciousness in robots and in organisations are capable of being manufactured; one can choose whether to build robots and organisations with qualia and subjective experience.

Originality/value

To the best of the author’s knowledge, no other computational interpretation of these aspects of consciousness exists. However, it is compatible with the multiple draft model of Dennett (1991) and the attention schema theory of Webb and Graziano (2015).

Citation

García-Baños, Á. (2019), "A computational theory of consciousness: qualia and the hard problem", Kybernetes, Vol. 48 No. 5, pp. 1078-1094. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-10-2017-0387