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Collecting channel selection and information value of a closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility

Kebing Chen (College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China)
Qi Wang (College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing, China)
Shengbin Wang (School of Business, The College of New Jersey, Ewing, New Jersey, USA)

Kybernetes

ISSN: 0368-492X

Article publication date: 24 November 2021

Issue publication date: 3 March 2023

280

Abstract

Purpose

The paper aims to explore how the participants in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) select collecting strategies under the scenarios of information symmetry and asymmetry, and to investigate the value of corporate social responsibility (CSR) cost information for participants.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper constructs a two-echelon CLSC Stackelberg game consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer, where the manufacturer undertakes CSR and is responsible for the remanufacturing of used products. First, the authors establish two collecting models under information symmetry: manufacturer-collecting and retailer-collecting. Second, the authors construct two collecting models under information asymmetry and propose a two-part tariff contract to coordinate the participants’ profits. Finally, the authors make a numerical analysis to verify the results.

Findings

Under information symmetry, the profit of the participant who does not undertake collecting is positively related to the collecting rate, and the other participant may not benefit from the increase in the collecting rate. Under information asymmetry, the manufacturer will still select the retailer-collecting channel. Asymmetric information only affects the retailer’s selection. In addition, the manufacturer’s private CSR cost information is always valuable to the retailer.

Originality/value

This paper first explores the influence of the CSR cost information value on the selection of collecting channel under information asymmetry in the CLSC. The results can help company managers choose optimal collecting channel under information symmetry or under information asymmetry.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the editor-in-chief, the associate editor and three anonymous referees for their constructive comments and encouragements that have helped improve the paper greatly. The work was partly supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under the grant numbers 71971113 and 71571100 and China Scholarship Council.

Citation

Chen, K., Wang, Q. and Wang, S. (2023), "Collecting channel selection and information value of a closed-loop supply chain with corporate social responsibility", Kybernetes, Vol. 52 No. 3, pp. 1027-1056. https://doi.org/10.1108/K-04-2021-0284

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2021, Emerald Publishing Limited

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