TY  - JOUR
AB  - Purpose The purpose of this paper is to examine the relationships between CEO ownership, stock option compensation, and risk taking. The authors include important CEO power variables as moderators.Design/methodology/approach The paper uses a longitudinal regression analysis. In addition, the paper includes interactional plots for further interpretation.Findings The results indicate that CEO ownership reduces risk taking, while there is a partial support that stock options increase risk taking. CEO tenure is a powerful moderator that decreases risk taking in both CEO ownership and CEO stock option scenarios. Board independence, counter to the hypothesis in this paper, may encourage risk taking.Research limitations/implications The findings in this paper provide support for the inclusion of CEO power variables in CEO compensation studies. However, the study examines large publicly traded companies; thus, all findings may not be applicable to small- and medium-sized companies.Originality/value Scholars have encouraged more complex CEO compensation models and the authors have examined both main effect and interaction models.
VL  - 11
IS  - 3
SN  - 1755-425X
DO  - 10.1108/JSMA-08-2017-0055
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/JSMA-08-2017-0055
AU  - Olson Bradley
AU  - Parayitam Satyanarayana
AU  - Skousen Bradley
AU  - Skousen Christopher
PY  - 2018
Y1  - 2018/01/01
TI  - How to strike a balance between CEO compensation and strategic risk? A longitudinal analysis
T2  - Journal of Strategy and Management
PB  - Emerald Publishing Limited
SP  - 387
EP  - 417
Y2  - 2021/03/05
ER  -