San Francisco: rental restrictions and pre-restriction host listing motivation

Abstract

Purpose

San Francisco started regulating short-term vacation rentals on rooms/apartments/houses located within city limits in September 2019. The objectives of this conceptual-scenario and regression study are to calculate the present value of the net earnings for a short-term residential rental property located in San Francisco pre-regulation and post-regulation, and consider a financial reason motivating households to list properties as short-term rentals.

Design/methodology/approach

A present value approach is used to estimate the value of rental space to tourists prior to the passage of San Francisco's short-term rental regulations compared to post-rental rules. Table 2 shows pre- and post-income scenarios. Price increases of +20, +40 and +60 percent over the initial base rate failed to restore host earnings to pre-registration levels. The present value model calculates the net revenue less net cost associated with listing a property. The regression model uses the number of listings as the dependent variable, and housing prices divided by weekly wages as independent variables.

Findings

The short-term rental regulations significantly reduce the profitability associated with short-term tourist stays offered by hosts and listed by online platforms. A host earns pre-regulation income when average daily rents increase by approximately 71.5 percent. It will likely limit income earned by hosts and Airbnb and other shared housing website platforms due to the reduced number of rental days allowed for shared housing caused by ordinances and host enrollment restrictions. The regression model results suggest that homeowners were listing properties for rent to help cover higher priced property purchases.

Research limitations/implications

Airbnb, VRBO, Booking.com, and HomeAway are all private companies; this means that financial information is not publicly available. HomeAway, VRBO, and Booking.com are companies owned by Expedia. FlipKey is owned by TripAdvisor. Due to limited public information regarding income statements and property listing trends, regression analysis and descriptive statistics cannot be generated using audited financial statements.

Practical implications

Rent control restriction frequently sets the maximum price below the market-clearing price, which results in limited supply but increase in demand for housing. The San Francisco regulations outlaw second-home rentals and seriously limit the availability of other rentals to tourists. FlipKey and HomeAway tend to rent second homes, which San Francisco now bars from being rented for short-term.

Social implications

The San Francisco restrictions were enacted with the goal of increasing the supply of rental housing available to permanent residents by restricting short-term rentals. This may have limited short-term benefits to permanent residents, but in the long term lowers income associated with single-family housing which will encourage housing arrangements that would avoid leasing restrictions and lower the number of new houses built. Other cities also have a history of rent controls, and are experiencing housing shortages and at the same time attracting large numbers of tourists. These cities may be motivated to enact similar rental restrictions as those approved in San Francisco.

Originality/value

These short-term rental restrictions just started being implemented and enforced. A court decision upheld them. There were media reports outlining the restrictions, but enforcement has just started, so no research papers have been written about San Francisco. Prior research studies have not used net present value analysis to calculate the loss to the host by enacted ordinances restricting tourists’ length of stay and have neither tried to explain why homeowners are listing properties for short-term rentals.

Citation

Brotman, B.A. (2020), "San Francisco: rental restrictions and pre-restriction host listing motivation", Journal of Property Investment & Finance, Vol. 38 No. 2, pp. 147-155. https://doi.org/10.1108/JPIF-09-2019-0128