“No safe haven”: denying entry to the corrupt as a new anti-corruption policy
Abstract
Purpose
This paper aims to provide an overview of the “no safe haven” anti-corruption commitment recently announced by the G20. The essence of this approach lies in denying entry to individuals reasonably believed to be complicit in massive corruption.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper is based on the analysis of international legal instruments and relevant domestic legislation (US statutes, in particular the Magnitsky Act 2012), as well as on scholarly discussions.
Findings
Proceeding from the analysis of deficiencies in the current anti-money laundering regime, this paper makes an argument in favour of adoption of the “no safe haven” policy as a legal standard in anti-corruption cooperation, rather than a voluntary initiative.
Practical implications
The adoption by states of the approach advocated in this paper will strengthen, or so it is submitted, the international anti-corruption regime. Importantly, it will help curb impunity of those who are shielded from investigation and prosecution in their home countries.
Originality/value
This paper considers basic legal and policy arguments that support the “no safe haven” anti-corruption policy. Due to the novelty of this approach and the dearth of academic literature on this topic, this may be a valuable contribution to the current anti-corruption discussions.
Keywords
Citation
Moiseienko, A. (2015), "“No safe haven”: denying entry to the corrupt as a new anti-corruption policy", Journal of Money Laundering Control, Vol. 18 No. 4, pp. 400-410. https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-01-2014-0004
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2015, Emerald Group Publishing Limited