Drivers for voluntary intellectual capital reporting based on agency theory

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the drivers for voluntary intellectual capital (IC) reporting based on agency theory. This study responds to calls for critical investigations of IC reporting utilising Goebel’s (2015a) IC measuring approach to investigate the role of IC value and mispricing for IC reporting.

Design/methodology/approach

A mandatory management report offers a unique research setting in Germany. The content analysis results of 428 German management reports are used in a regression analysis with leverage, ownership diffusion, IC value and mispricing. Additionally, a propensity score matching approach examines the relationship between IC reporting and IC value.

Findings

The regression results show that companies use voluntary IC reporting to encounter mispricing. IC reporting is negatively associated with leverage, whereas ownership diffusion and IC value show no significant results. The propensity score matching approach is also not significant.

Research limitations/implications

This study contributes to strengthening and testing agency theory for IC reporting. As mispricing is identified to play an important role for IC reporting, IC research should account for mispricing.

Practical implications

The findings suggest to reopen a discussion on the declared aims of the German management report and the international integrated reporting model to provide information on value creation, as IC value shows no link to IC reporting.

Originality/value

This study innovatively links IC reporting to IC value and mispricing to investigate drivers for voluntary IC reporting.

Citation

Goebel, V. (2019), "Drivers for voluntary intellectual capital reporting based on agency theory", Journal of Intellectual Capital, Vol. 20 No. 2, pp. 264-281. https://doi.org/10.1108/JIC-01-2018-0019