TY  - JOUR
AB  - Purpose The purpose of this paper is to view political candidates as products in a market competing over quality via advertising. Consequently, the Austrian argument against restrictions on product advertising can be applied to political markets as well. The foremost conclusion is a disproportionately negative effect of campaign finance restrictions on lesser-known incumbents and third-party candidates. A counterargument is also presented that campaign finance restrictions may solve a prisoner’s dilemma.Design/methodology/approach The author provides an initial test of these hypotheses with data from US Senate races occurring before and after the passage of the McCain-Feingold Act of 2002.Findings Empirical results show a strong incumbency advantage, but no disproportionate harm to lesser-known candidates or third parties from the passage of the act.Originality/value The paper provides a new perspective on the role of the political candidate and purpose of campaign advertising. The first pass empirics suggest, however, that only a major revision in campaign advertising rules could significantly alter the predictors of challenger vote shares.
VL  - 7
IS  - 3
SN  - 2045-2101
DO  - 10.1108/JEPP-D-18-00028
UR  - https://doi.org/10.1108/JEPP-D-18-00028
AU  - Roth M. Garrett
PY  - 2018
Y1  - 2018/01/01
TI  - Selling yourself: a preliminary analysis of political candidates as marketers and entrepreneurs
T2  - Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy
PB  - Emerald Publishing Limited
SP  - 269
EP  - 278
Y2  - 2024/09/19
ER  -