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Information-sharing strategy for online platform: the impact of suppliers’ price and advertising competition

Dongsheng Yang (School of Economics and Management, Hubei University of Arts and Science, Xiangyang, China)
Minghui Xu (School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China)

Journal of Contemporary Marketing Science

ISSN: 2516-7480

Article publication date: 5 November 2020

Issue publication date: 12 October 2020

472

Abstract

Purpose

In recent years, with the rapid development of the Internet and e-commerce, the online retail business has grown rapidly. E-commerce platforms can track different click data to understand consumer behavior and demand preferences, so as to make better demand forecasts, and strategically share this information with upstream suppliers. When the platform charges a certain fee for the shared data, the suppliers face the question of whether to purchase demand information. This article aims to analyze the influence of price competition and advertising competition on the suppliers' decisions to purchase information and the online platform for data pricing.

Design/methodology/approach

By using static game with incomplete information, this paper explores information-sharing strategies of an online platform with two competitive brand suppliers. The authors use Nash game to analyze the suppliers' purchasing information decision and then obtain the optimal information price of the online platform with information-sharing contract.

Findings

This paper shows that demand information sharing benefits both the platform and the suppliers. Without information contracts, the online platform is willing to share demand information with at least one supplier. Especially, when the consumer's sensitivity to advertising is larger and the commission fee charged by the online platform is small, the online platforms will share information with only one supplier. Based on the game outcomes between the suppliers, two pricing strategies for information are proposed under which at least one supplier purchases information. If the consumers are less (more) sensitive to advertising competition, pricing strategy of the online platform induces both suppliers (only one supplier) to purchase information.

Originality/value

At present, most of the information-sharing articles are based on the traditional purchase and sale mode. Based on the background of e-commerce, this paper examines the online platform's information-sharing strategies, which has certain innovation. In addition, the results show that the information-sharing strategy of the online platform is affected by both the price and advertising competitiveness, which provides a new expansion and supplement for the information-sharing literature.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

This article was previously published in Mandarin as【许明辉、杨东升, “网络平台信息共享策略:供应商价格与广告竞争的影响”, 营销科学学报, 14(3-4), 136-150】. This translation appears here with the permission of the Chinese Marketing Association of Universities.Funding: This work is partially supported by Foundation for Humanities and Social Sciences of Ministry of Education of China (19YJA630095) and National Natural Science Foundation of China (71371146).

Citation

Yang, D. and Xu, M. (2020), "Information-sharing strategy for online platform: the impact of suppliers’ price and advertising competition", Journal of Contemporary Marketing Science, Vol. 3 No. 3, pp. 365-384. https://doi.org/10.1108/JCMARS-08-2020-0032

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2020, Emerald Publishing Limited

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