The purpose of this paper is to examine whether political connections further impair auditor independence by investigating the relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees and as to whether political connections moderate such relationship.
This study employs panel regression analysis. The panel data set consists of 379 firm-year observations for three years from year 2001 to 2003.
Based on 379 firm-year observations for the period of 2001-2003, grounded on two proxies of political connections namely politically connected firms and the proportion of Bumiputras directors, the authors find a positive and significant relationship between non-audit fees and audit fees, and the relationship becomes weaker, only for Bumiputra-dominated firms connected firms.
This study contributes to the extant literature by examining the role of political connections in the context of auditor independence. In addition, this study is conducted in Malaysia, which provides a unique institutional environment with the existence of political connections that is built on ethnic grounds.
The authors would like to say thank you to two anonymous reviewers for valuable comments. The authors extend the gratitude to Professor Ferdinand Gul for his guidance and the AFAANZ 2010 conference for useful suggestions.
Abdul Wahab, E., Mat Zain, M. and Abdul Rahman, R. (2015), "Political connections: a threat to auditor independence?", Journal of Accounting in Emerging Economies, Vol. 5 No. 2, pp. 222-246. https://doi.org/10.1108/JAEE-03-2012-0013Download as .RIS
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