The prohibition of speculation in Islamic finance: fairness and framing

Abstract

Purpose

This paper aims to present a simple behavioural explanation of the prohibition of speculation in Islamic finance.

Design/methodology/approach

This paper proposes a theoretical model that describes how investors from low income strata of the society may be prone to make sub-optimal decisions when they compare their outcome from a speculative trading activity to that of the counterparty to the trade and perceive inequity to exist.

Findings

When individuals from low income strata of the society compare their current situation with the average income of the society, they perceive themselves to be in a loss. This creates a loss frame within which they then evaluate all future outcomes. When such individuals invest in speculative trading activities and incur a loss, they compare their outcome from the trade to that of the counterparty to the trade. As speculative trades are a zero sum game, the counterparty makes an equivalent gain from the trade. Thus, the comparison leads to a perception of inequity. This perception of inequity is aggravated by the loss frame within which the investor is operating. The aggravated inequity aversion may then motivate the investor to make further sub-optimal decisions like repeated speculative trading activities. The Islamic prohibition on speculative trading activities may serve to protect low income investors from entering into such cycles of sub-optimal decisions.

Originality/value

This paper offers a unique explanation of why day trading and short selling may be prohibited in Islamic capital markets.

Citation

Kanwal, A. (2022), "The prohibition of speculation in Islamic finance: fairness and framing", International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, Vol. 15 No. 1, pp. 146-157. https://doi.org/10.1108/IMEFM-01-2021-0034