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Revenue sharing contract coordination of wind turbine order policy and aftermarket service based on joint effort

Ling Liang (Tourism and Event Management School, Shanghai University of International Business and Economics, Shanghai, China)
Jiaping Xie (Department of Operations Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China)
Luhao Liu (Department of Operations Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China)
Yu Xia (Department of Operations Management, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics, Shanghai, China)

Industrial Management & Data Systems

ISSN: 0263-5577

Article publication date: 13 March 2017

651

Abstract

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss how wind farms attract wind turbine manufacturers to get involved in wind turbines’ maintenance service with revenue sharing contract of bundled service under which the background of operation and maintenance (O&M) aftermarket of wind turbine exists. The authors also try to extend the results to the application of product plus service business mode on large-scale equipment O&M service. At present, Chinese wind power industry is suffering from production capacity redundancy. The profit levels for both wind farm and wind turbine manufacturers are relatively low. It is significant for Chinese wind power industry development to coordinate the supply chain of wind power in order to reduce O&M costs and increase revenues.

Design/methodology/approach

The present paper discusses product plus aftermarket service contract design on the background of closed-loop product service chain and uncertain equipment demand using revenue sharing contract model.

Findings

If centralized decision making is assumed, the authors find that the wind turbine order increases as the aftermarket service effort level and aftermarket service profit increase; aftermarket service effort level is positively correlative to the service efficiency. On the other hand, if decentralized decision making is assumed, the wind turbine order increases as share of the aftermarket service chain by manufacturer to wind farm increases and share of product supply chain by wind farm to manufacturer decreases. The optimal effort level of wind farm increases as the share of aftermarket service chain increases while the optimal effort level of the manufacturer is a concave function of share of aftermarket service chain if service quality linear correlates with effort level. Meanwhile, the authors find that the revenues of the product supply chain and aftermarket service chain have a concave relationship. This relationship is not affected by the format of relationship between service quality and effort level (linear or exponential).

Practical implications

The results could potentially be used to provide the wind turbine manufacturer with a greater profit space and satisfy wind farm’s equipment maintenance demand at the same time. It can also guide the practice of revenue sharing in the aftermarket service and manufacturing servitization.

Originality/value

In this model, the authors assumed that both the forward revenue sharing of power generation by wind farm to manufacturer and the backward revenue sharing of maintenance service by the manufacturer to wind farm exist in closed-loop product service chain. Then the authors discussed channel coordination of such cross-revenue sharing contract.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The work was supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71273091, “Study on the Pricing Mechanism of the Industrial Chain of Renewable Energy Power under the Goal of the Carbon Intensity”; Grant No. 71272015, “Contract Optimization and its Application Research of Closed-Loop Product Service Chain Based on Internet of Things”).

Citation

Liang, L., Xie, J., Liu, L. and Xia, Y. (2017), "Revenue sharing contract coordination of wind turbine order policy and aftermarket service based on joint effort", Industrial Management & Data Systems, Vol. 117 No. 2, pp. 320-345. https://doi.org/10.1108/IMDS-03-2016-0088

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2017, Emerald Publishing Limited

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