Social action theory for understanding information security non-compliance in hospitals: The importance of user rationale

Abstract

Purpose

Employees' compliance with information security policies is considered an essential component of information security management. The research aims to illustrate the usefulness of social action theory (SAT) for management of information security.

Design/methodology/approach

This research was carried out as a longitudinal case study at a Swedish hospital. Data were collected using a combination of interviews, information security documents, and observations. Data were analysed using a combination of a value-based compliance model and the taxonomy laid out in SAT to determine user rationality.

Findings

The paper argues that management of information security and design of countermeasures should be based on an understanding of users' rationale covering both intentional and unintentional non-compliance. The findings are presented in propositions with practical and theoretical implications: P1. Employees' non-compliance is predominantly based on means-end calculations and based on a practical rationality, P2. An information security investigation of employees' rationality should not be based on an a priori assumption about user intent, P3. Information security management and choice of countermeasures should be based on an understanding of the use rationale, and P4. Countermeasures should target intentional as well as unintentional non-compliance.

Originality/value

This work is an extension of Hedström et al. arguing for the importance of addressing user rationale for successful management of information security. The presented propositions can form a basis for information security management, making the objectives underlying the study presented in Hedström et al. more clear.

Citation

Hedström, K., Karlsson, F. and Kolkowska, E. (2013), "Social action theory for understanding information security non-compliance in hospitals: The importance of user rationale", Information Management & Computer Security, Vol. 21 No. 4, pp. 266-287. https://doi.org/10.1108/IMCS-08-2012-0043