China's government procurement negotiations in the electric energy sector with WTO members: A suggested theoretical model
Abstract
Purpose
Throughout negotiations to access the Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) of the WTO, China maintained the position of excluding the electric energy sector (EES) from its offers, despite the urging of several GPA members. The purpose of this paper is to raise a question regarding what these countries have to offer in exchange for their own requirements. Can they offer reciprocal conditions, one of the fundamental negotiation principles of the GPA? If not, could this help explain China's position?
Design/methodology/approach
This paper addresses this negotiation problem by proposing a new theoretical model that emerges from the case of China. The suggested model is tested through a multiple case study comparative analysis of EES openness of 32 members of GPA: Canada, the 28 countries of the European Union, Japan, Korea and the USA within the context of the GPA.
Findings
The findings not only suggest that the examined countries cannot offer reciprocity in regards to their requirements of China, but that their openness among each other is also marginal. Therefore, reciprocity is a condition of success in GPAs among countries and the suggested theoretical model is corroborated and grounded in multiple cases.
Research limitations/implications
The suggested theoretical model provides an approach to better equilibrate parties’ openness among international agreements on government procurement (GP). Nevertheless, these negotiations expose the problematic nature of information accessibility, as well as the comparability of specific data that are available, and that the real equilibrium rests on companies that are awarded contracts after an agreement is signed.
Practical implications
This exploratory research addresses actual negotiation problems with a new theoretical model that can be useful for negotiators and policy makers as well as for foreign multinational companies to better understand whether or not a given country will liberalize their GP.
Originality/value
The suggested theoretical model can be generalized to other sectors of activity or similar agreements to better understand the strategic stakes of a country within the realm of such negotiations.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
A former work in progress version of this paper has been presented at the International Public Procurement Conference (IPPC) in Seattle on August 18, 2012 and at the China Goes Global Conference in Cambridge, USA, on October 9, 2012 entitled: “The China’s Government Procurement International Trade Negotiations in the Energy Sector with WTO members.”
The author would like to express his deepest gratitude to Professor Bernard de Montmorillon from the Paris Dauphine University for his precious guidance and tremendous encouragement throughout this research. The author would also like to extend his appreciation to Sylvain Cloutier Fillion, Donald Bidd, and Luke Hudson for their valued contribution to the language editing of this paper. Finally, the author would like to thank Guijang Lu for her Chinese-to-English translation, her assistance in his understanding of the Chinese culture as well as her immeasurable support throughout this project.
Citation
Coudé, S. (2014), "China's government procurement negotiations in the electric energy sector with WTO members: A suggested theoretical model", International Journal of Emerging Markets, Vol. 9 No. 2, pp. 294-315. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJoEM-09-2012-0097
Publisher
:Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2014, Emerald Group Publishing Limited