Welfare effects of state-owned multinational enterprises: A view from agency and incomplete contracts theory
International Journal of Public Sector Management
ISSN: 0951-3558
Article publication date: 5 March 2018
Abstract
Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to theoretically investigate the potential welfare effects of state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs) international operations.
Design/methodology/approach
The paper is conceptual, applying standard economics state ownership theory based on agency theory and incomplete contracts theory to different forms of SOE cross-border operations.
Findings
When private firms are risk averse or financially constrained, or when writing complete contracts and making credible commitments are not possible, state ownership can achieve objectives such as international operations supporting domestic industrial policy, addressing social objectives in another government’s territory and addressing transnational market failures. Welfare effects may, however, also depend on home-host country relationships.
Originality/value
This is the first application of standard economics state ownership theory to state-owned multinationals. The analysis shows that key conclusions from the state ownership literature in a domestic setting can be extended to international operations, and highlights new theoretical issues arising from SOEs going beyond their home jurisdiction to that of another government.
Keywords
Acknowledgements
The author thanks the editors, the three anonymous reviewers and Ingrid Leknes for their essential inputs which greatly helped improve the paper. The author also thanks Gabriel R.G. Benito, Trude Gunnes, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Alexander Schjøll and participants at the 2014 Annual Meeting of the Norwegian Association of Economists (Forskermøtet), BI Norwegian Business School (Oslo, Norway) and at the 2014 FIBE Annual Meeting, Norwegian School of Economics (Bergen, Norway) for helpful comments and discussions on an early draft.
Citation
Rygh, A. (2018), "Welfare effects of state-owned multinational enterprises: A view from agency and incomplete contracts theory", International Journal of Public Sector Management, Vol. 31 No. 2, pp. 207-220. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-03-2017-0110
Publisher
:Emerald Publishing Limited
Copyright © 2018, Emerald Publishing Limited