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Ready for european economic and monetary union? Party composition of government, budgeting institutions and fiscal deficit in central and eastern europe

Vesselin Dimitrov (Department of Government, The London School of Economics and Political Science)

International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior

ISSN: 1093-4537

Article publication date: 1 March 2005

52

Abstract

This article examines the effect of party composition of government on the centralization of budgeting institutions in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria in 1989-1999, and assesses the impact of the centralization of budgeting institutions on the capacity of these countries to meet the fiscal deficit requirement for the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) membership. The article finds that centralization of budgeting institutions through delegation to a strong finance minister and/or prime minister is likely to occur in one-party governments or coalition governments composed of parties which expect to fight repeated elections together, with effective punishment mechanisms. The article finds that countries with centralized budgeting institutions are likely to be more capable of meeting the EMU deficit requirement than countries with decentralized institutions.

Citation

Dimitrov, V. (2005), "Ready for european economic and monetary union? Party composition of government, budgeting institutions and fiscal deficit in central and eastern europe", International Journal of Organization Theory & Behavior, Vol. 8 No. 1, pp. 40-66. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJOTB-08-01-2005-B002

Publisher

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Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2005 by PrAcademics Press

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