To read this content please select one of the options below:

Powerful political corporate appointments and firm bribery channels

Hamish D. Anderson (School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand)
Jing Liao (School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand)
Jingjing Yang (Guangdong University of Foreign Studies, Guangzhou, China)
Martin Young (School of Economics and Finance, Massey University, Palmerston North, New Zealand)

International Journal of Managerial Finance

ISSN: 1743-9132

Article publication date: 6 May 2022

Issue publication date: 2 May 2023

203

Abstract

Purpose

The authors examine the influence of powerful political corporate appointments on the usage of firm bribery channels. Party Secretaries within Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) may simultaneously hold top management positions, thereby endowing powerful firm-level decision rights on those appointees, hereafter referred to as powerful dual role Party Secretaries.

Design/methodology/approach

This study employs panel data analysis with industry and year fixed effects. The authors use a sample of 1,143 Chinese SOEs listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2004 to 2015.

Findings

The authors find that powerful dual role Party Secretaries are associated with greater bribery channel usage. Following the ongoing anticorruption campaign, SOEs with the powerful appointments significantly reduce their usage of both transparent (entertainment and travel costs) and opaque bribery (abnormal management expenses) channels. However, in general, Chinese SOEs respond to the anticorruption shock by switching from the more transparent to the opaquer bribery channel.

Originality/value

The authors contribute to the ongoing debate of politicians on corporate boards by examining the relatively unexplored area of government appointed top management and their influence on bribery at the firm level.

Keywords

Acknowledgements

The authors appreciate the helpful comments from the participants of the 10th Asia/Pacific FMA International Conference in Hong Kong. The authors also thank the participants in a Massey University seminar for their helpful comments.

Citation

Anderson, H.D., Liao, J., Yang, J. and Young, M. (2023), "Powerful political corporate appointments and firm bribery channels", International Journal of Managerial Finance, Vol. 19 No. 3, pp. 491-518. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJMF-05-2021-0237

Publisher

:

Emerald Publishing Limited

Copyright © 2022, Emerald Publishing Limited

Related articles