Compares the way women are taxed in the Germany, Sweden and The Netherlands by looking at both macro and micro data from the perspective of a wife′s contribution to family income. The programs used for analysis are included in an appendix. Taxing husbands and wives by adding joint incomes and dividing by two (as in Germany) penalises dual‐earner couples and favours one‐earner couples. Completely separate taxation (as in Sweden) is a major incentive for couples to be dual‐earner. In The Netherlands the government reform of the tax system (1990) has reduced negative tax effects on secondary earnings without introducing the positive effects seen in Sweden. Tax incentives are not the only determinant of women′s participation in the labour market.
Gustafsson, S.S. and Bruyn‐Hundt, M. (1991), "Incentives for Women to Work: A Comparison between The Netherlands, Sweden and West Germany", Journal of Economic Studies, Vol. 18 No. 5/6. https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000000159
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